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Barcelona’s most prominent newspaper, La Vanguardia, framed a fierce resistance  
to Franco during the Spanish Civil War even when it became clear that defeat was 
imminent.  Its writers and editors made a desperate plea for democratic values, not just to 
struggling locals or the international community they still sought to recruit, but to future 
generations. These journalists thus proved uniquely discerning of the implications of their 
work, appearing to recognize outright that they had lost the war in the hope that their legacy 
might one day be recovered. In a striking break with the past, La Vanguardia designated 
itself the “guardian of democracy” and argued for the newfound rights of women, 
minorities, and workers. This thesis examines the rise and fall of the Second Spanish 
Republic, the ideals stirred up in revolutionary Barcelona, and the significant role assumed 
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 In introducing this thesis, I find myself echoing the words of the Spanish lawyer 
and  political historian Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo: “I, a sinner, confess to my readers–should 
I be so lucky to have them–the grave sin of audacity, for daring to attempt the study of the 
evolution of Catalan thought in its political-regional aspect, so as to contribute to the 
examination of the contemporary Catalanist movement.”1 Yet I, like Ossorio before me, 
also believe that ambitious projects tend to be the most worthwhile. Ossorio sought to 
understand the discord of his time, to get to the root of the chaotic nationalism storming 
Barcelona. In my case, it began as an overwhelming quest to uncover just a little bit more 
of the culture of a bygone era. 
 I first became interested in the Spanish Civil War when I learned of my great 
uncle’s involvement in the International Brigades. Milton, as he called himself, was a 
promising student with a scholarship to the University of Chicago Medical School who 
gave up everything to fight for Spanish democracy. Records show that he arrived in Spain 
in 1937. He died in the Battle of the Ebro in November 1938 at twenty-four years of age.  
 As a student of Spanish language and culture at Smith College, I spent time in 
Salamanca, Córdoba, and Barcelona. Though nearly all Spanish cities bear the scars of the 
Civil War, Barcelona is an exceptional case. Bullet holes still mark the façades of 
                                                 
1 Ángel Ossorio, Historia del pensamiento político catalán durante la guerra de 
España con la República Francesa, 1793-1795 (Madrid: 1913), 7. 
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Barcelona’s most prominent churches and ministerial buildings, numerous monuments 
stand to honor the dead, and the elderly, when prompted enough, will quietly tell you the 
harrowing tales of the childhood they lost to violence, poverty, and starvation. This 
experience ignited in me a passion for the multicultural city that seemed always to be in 
contention with the rest of Spain. Was it Spanish or Catalan? Should it proclaim itself the 
capital of an independent state or remain at the center of Spanish commerce? Even a 
detailed study of its history, as Ossorio discovered, offers no decisive answer.  
When digging through the primary sources, I became so fascinated by their style 
and content that I took it upon myself to provide English-language translations of the 
Spanish text.  My advanced training in literary translation at the University of Edinburgh 
prepared me for this endeavor, as quality translation requires more than linguistic fluency. 
Though sometimes treated as mechanical and straightforward, translation demands an 
enormous amount of tact, creativity, and problem-solving in the attempt to reconcile the 
conflicting perceptions and values of different cultures and communities. At its core, 
translation involves the crossing of the supposedly insuperable barriers of language and 
culture and the forging of a deeper personal connection among nations around the globe. 
Unless stated otherwise, all Spanish translations presented here are my own work. 
My research has taken me from La Vanguardia’s online database to the General 
Archive of the Spanish Civil War in Salamanca, Spain. I will never forget sorting through 
documents in the bitter January cold or the help of the senior archivist who never let me 
out of his sight. I never could have completed this thesis without the guidance of my advisor 
Dr. Kimberley Mangun, my committee members Dr. Kevin Coe and Dr. Robin Jensen, or 
the support of my friends and family. I owe a special thanks to Professors Miriam and 
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Sonia Albert Sobrino (better known as ALSO Sisters), to Micah Neiman, Saba Rebecca 
Brause, and Michelle Anjirbag, and to my parents, for their endless patience and 
encouragement.   
 It is my hope that this master’s thesis will provide readers with knowledge and 
understanding of a subject to which I have dedicated my academic career. To call upon 
Ossorio once more: “What is the purpose of demonstrating such inadequacy? For whose 
benefit do I undertake this venture? I will explain the incongruity. May the quality of my 
argument make up for my mistakes.”2
                                                 
2 The original words are as follows (I altered them slightly in my preface): “¿Quién 
le mete A V. en la aventura? ¿Para qué se empeña en exhibir su insuficiencia? ¿A beneficio 
de quién acomete V. un trabajo tan evidentemente superior a sus elementos de acción? 
Trataré de explicar la incongruencia. Y quiera Dios que la calidad de mis razones sirva de 
perdón a mis yerros.” See Ángel Ossorio, Historia del pensamiento político catalán 












 Barcelona stood on the verge of collapse. Fascist planes bombed the city, reducing 
entire neighborhoods to rubble, while hordes of soldiers prepared for the final assault. 
Thousands of refugees fled the Catalan capital for France, a border most of them would 
never reach. Within twenty-four hours, Francisco Franco’s forces would overtake 
Barcelona and declare an end to the brutal campaign known as the “Catalan offensive.”3 It 
was January 25, 1939, Barcelona’s last day as part of the Second Spanish Republic, but the 
journalists of La Vanguardia refused to desert its cause, continuing to voice fierce 
ideological resistance even when defeat proved imminent. They wrote:  
Our words do not affect the government as regards the outcome of this war. This 
outcome remains inevitable. We cannot lose the war, because that would mean to 
lose democracy her greatest bastion, her most ardent breath...Our dead command 
us to resist. To stop the invaders in their tracks. To scream anew: They shall not 
pass!...But it depends, not so much on the government as on the bravery of our 
soldiers and the support of our citizens, to ensure that all goes according to plan! 
We are not defying the Fates, who change at times, because, in the case of Spain’s 
independence, the Fates cannot be different from what they always were, for the 
love of our people I invoke their honorable qualities. Our enemy must hurry, but 
destiny need never hurry.4  
 
                                                 
3  Helen Graham, The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 102. 
4 La Vanguardia, January 25, 1939. 
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Barcelona’s biggest newspaper thus framed its ultimate resistance to autocracy in the form 
of a desperate plea–not just to struggling locals or the international community it still 
sought to recruit, but to future generations. In this way, La Vanguardia’s journalists proved 
uniquely discerning of the implications of their work, appearing to recognize outright that 
they had lost the war while hoping that their legacy might one day be recovered. Since 
Francisco Franco’s death in 1975, Spaniards have slowly begun to come to terms with their 
traumatic past and restore the democracy they first attempted in 1931. Historians have 
conducted intensive research into the communist and fascist propaganda of the time, the 
role and organization of the famed International Brigades, and the roots of the conflict 
itself, yet few have investigated the style or content of contemporary coverage, not even in 
the nation’s most prominent periodicals.5 
 The concept of resistance, its framing and design, remains a topic of interest across 
numerous academic disciplines, including history, political science, and communication, 
among others, yet researchers tend to focus on it only in its moments of triumph, that is, 
the French Resistance in World War II, the American and Russian Revolutions, the 
independence wars of colonized nations. However, in neglecting the resistance movements 
of unsuccessful causes, scholars miss an important piece of history with the potential to 
reveal deeper truths concerning media’s key role in the narration of conflict, the protection 
                                                 
5  Michael Seidman, “Spanish Social Idealism: The Ideological Art of the 
Revolution in Barcelona (1936-38),” Mediterranean Studies 2 (1990): 113-127; Michael 
Seidman, “Work and Revolution: Workers' Control in Barcelona in the Spanish Civil War, 
1936-38,” Journal of Contemporary History 17.3 (1982): 409-433; Antonio Cazorla‐
Sánchez, “Dictatorship from Below: Local Politics in the Making of the Francoist State, 
1937–1948,” The Journal of Modern History 71.4 (1999): 882-901; Miriam Basilio, 
"Genealogies for a New State: Painting and Propaganda in Franco's Spain, 1936-1940,” 




and/or promotion of political ideologies, and the construction and reconstruction of cultural 
memory in divided nations. Barcelona, an example of such “resistance” (and considered 
the heart of Republican fervor), can only be understood through the development of the 
“historical imagination” in which its cultural history is taken into account.6  
 La Vanguardia, Catalonia’s leading newspaper that also boasts the fourth highest 
readership in Spain, has had a long and tumultuous history since it first appeared in print 
in 1881.7 Its dissemination of liberal ideas until the conclusion of the Spanish Civil War 
rendered it a point of contention in conservative circles dominating early modern Spanish 
society.8 Literally translated as “The Vanguard” in English, this iconic title aptly describes 
its fierce resistance to autocracy and the rise of fascism in the 1930s. It worked tirelessly 
throughout the war as a staunch defender of democracy, publishing six days a week in order 
to invigorate and inform the population. Furthermore, it did so under the direction of María 
Luz Morales Godoy, the first woman ever to head a Spanish newspaper.9  
 Ultimately “reprogrammed” to endorse the Falangist regime (during which time it 
was renamed La Vanguardia Española), La Vanguardia has since returned to its liberal 
                                                 
6  James W. Carey, “The Problem of Journalism History,” Journalism History 
(Spring 1974): 4-5. 
7 A. Nieto Tamargo, La Empresa Periodística en España (Pamplona: Ediciones 
Universidad de Navarra, S. A, 1973), 72, 145.  
8  Grupo Godó, La Vanguardia: Historia (Barcelona: Grupo Godó, 2013). 
www.grupogodo.net/institucional/historia/.   
9 Teresa Amiguet, “María Luz Morales, el periodismo tiene nombre de mujer,” La  
Vanguardia, September 22, 2015.  
www.lavanguardia.com/hemeroteca/20150922/54435276929/maria-luz-morales-
periodismo-mujeres-espana-directoras-la-vanguardia-prensa-historia-franquismo-
cine.html; La Vanguardia, August 7, 1936.    
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roots and is now recognized for its pioneering journalism, innovative practices, and for 
being “the oldest, continuously published paper in the country.” 10 This historic status 
makes it a compelling resource, yet it appears few scholars have studied its wartime 
communication strategies aside from a cursory look at the major events it reported. Among 
Barcelona’s most prominent periodicals of the period, such strategies merit analysis as they 
help to illuminate the role popular media might play in the advancement and preservation 
of political discourses of the past.  
 The press was (and still is) believed to hold significant sway over the views and 
daily lives of its readers. The public of the 1930s relied heavily upon the printed press as 
the main source of news, rendering periodicals like La Vanguardia to be particularly 
valuable sources of information.11 Moreover, La Vanguardia is especially relevant as it 
was connected to the Juan Negrín government, the official regime of the Second Spanish 
Republic during the Spanish Civil War.12 
 This research builds upon recent studies of the Spanish Civil War, its significance 
and present implications, the unique positionality of Barcelona in the conflict, and the 
ongoing dialogue of what constitutes Spanish national identity. For centuries, Spain has 
struggled to define itself, fighting a number of vicious battles in the process, from the Arab 
invasions of 711 to the final Reconquista of 1492 to the Catalan Revolts of the 1640s to 
                                                 
10 John A. Crow, Spain, the Root and the Flower: An Interpretation of Spain and 
the Spanish People (Berkley: University of California Press, 2005), 411. 
11 O. W. Riegel, “Press, Radio, and the Spanish Civil War,” The Public Opinion 
Quarterly 1.1 (1937): 131-36. 
12 Antony Beevor, The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2006), 271. 
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the present-day secessionist movements of Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country, to 
name but a few.13 Today, the Spanish Civil War may be dismissed as “ancient history” by 
the masses, but its memory lives on in the country’s cultural, artistic, political, and legal 
institutions, unfailingly stirring up debate and controversy whenever mentioned. In some 
ways, Spain’s troubled economy, political unrest, and renewed nationalist sentiments recall 
the early twentieth century, perhaps serving as a disquieting reminder that the matters 
which lay at the heart of the conflict were never fully resolved. As Arturo Pérez Reverte, 
elected member of the Real Academia Española (RAE), Spain’s official royal commission 
for the oversight of Spanish language, stated in one interview: “La Guerra Civil está 
resuelta, lo que no está resuelto es España” [The Civil War has been resolved, what hasn’t 
been resolved is Spain].14 Additionally, my research contributes to the study of wartime 
journalism as performed by those regions immediately impacted by violence, an aspect 
often overlooked in favor of foreign correspondence in international reporting. 
 This chapter outlines the historical context of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), 
the Western tradition of wartime journalism, and a description of the theory and 
methodology utilized to conduct my investigation. This thesis considers three research 
questions via framing analysis: (1) What were the primary frames crafted by La 
                                                 
13 J. N. Hillgarth, The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250-1516 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1978), 628; J. H. Elliott, The Revolt of the Catalans, a Study in the Decline of Spain, 1598-
1640 (Cambridge: University Press, 1963); Laura Desfor Edles, “A Culturalist Approach 
to Ethnic Nationalist Movements: Symbolization and Basque and Catalan Nationalism in 
Spain,” Social Science History 23.3 (1999): 311-355. 
14 Arturo Pérez Reverte, “La Guerra Civil está resuelta, lo que no está resuelto es 






Vanguardia in its coverage of the final year of the Spanish Civil War in 1938-1939 and 
how did they evolve? (2) What do these frames suggest about the political discourse of the 
era and (3) What do they reveal about the potential role of mainstream media in times of 
conflict in democratic societies? 
 
Historical Context: A Brief Overview of the Spanish Civil War  
 The Spanish Civil War, today recognized as Spain’s most devastating conflict, was 
a long time in the making.15 Though historians generally refer back to the advent of the 
Second Spanish Republic (1931) as its precursor, its beginnings may be traced back to the 
early nineteenth century. Spain’s crumbling economy, the loss of her overseas colonies, 
and the deteriorating conditions of the working class prompted a great deal of civil unrest.16 
Additionally, the liberal ideals proclaimed in the French Revolution had taken hold of 
Europe, not to be crushed or even contained by the prodigious efforts of the Congress of 
Vienna.  
 Spanish insurgents attempted to implement lasting constitutions in the brief 
interludes between increasingly unstable monarchies, first in 1812 and again in 1874, but 
their attempts proved ultimately unsuccessful. By the 1920s, Spain had fallen into such 
corruption and chaos that Miguel Primo de Rivera, an aristocrat and Captain General of 
the Military backed by King Alfonso XIII, overthrew the government and declared himself 
Prime Minister. Though he quickly implemented a number of effective reforms, among 
                                                 
15 P. F. Crespo,“Las mujeres durante la guerra civil,” Historia de las mujeres en 
España, Ed. Elisa Garrido González (Madrid: Editorial Síntesis, 1997), 515.  
 
16 B. Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counterrevolution (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 3.  
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them the construction of the Barcelona Metro and the expansion of electric power to rural 
regions, his policies failed to redress the country’s worsening economic hardships. By 
January 1930, he found he had lost so much support, including that of both the King and 
the Military (formerly his greatest strength), that he resigned from office. His exit coincided 
with the declaration of the Second Spanish Republic the next year, ushering in a new and 
democratic era.17 
 The first municipal elections were held in April of 1931 followed by elections of 
the Constituent Assembly in June, the latter of which was endowed with the responsibility 
of drafting a modern and Republican constitution for all Spain. Radical for its time, this 
new constitution implemented numerous progressive changes, including women’s 
suffrage, laws allowing for divorce, universal education, the disestablishment of the Jesuit 
Order, and the nullification of state privileges traditionally held by the Roman Catholic 
Church. Its administration promoted policies hostile to the monarchy and religious 
institutions, prompting Alfonso XIII to flee the country in exile just two days after the 
official inauguration of the Second Spanish Republic.18 
 Many scholars have speculated as to what led to the Republic’s decline, citing the 
                                                 
17 Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, “The Failure of the Liberal Project of the Spanish 
Nation-State, 1909-1938,” Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: 
Competing and Conflicting Identities (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1996), 130; Shlomo Ben-Ami, 
“The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera: A Political Reassessment,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 12 (1977): 65-84. 
 
18 Paul Preston, Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution 
in the Second Republic (Second Edition) (Florence, KY: Routledge, 1994), 74-75; Ana 
Aguado, “Citizenship and Gender Equality in the Second Spanish Republic: 
Representations and Practices in Socialist Culture (1931–1936),” Contemporary European 
History 23 (2014): 103; Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-
1939 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012), 25, 45, 48.  
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economic crises further complicated by the onset of the Great Depression (which hit 
Europe in the early 1930s), the growing class divide between rich and poor, the inability to 
adequately fulfill promises made in early political campaigns involving land reform and 
wealth redistribution, and the rise of fascism and communism. 19  Furthermore, Spain, 
already an ethnically and linguistically diverse nation, found itself divided in the face of 
bleak and uncertain prospects.20 By the official start of the Civil War in 1936, Spain had 
exercised democracy for only five short years, hardly enough time to win over the citizens’ 
trust. This lack of confidence in the new system of government caused critical breaks in 
the population, leading many to challenge the measures supposedly stipulated for Spain’s 
advancement.21  
 The Spanish military, a traditionally conservative body supporting the monarchy, 
instigated a revolt against the Second Spanish Republic under the leadership of General 
Francisco Franco. Military leaders perceived the Republic to be illegitimate, lawless, and 
“anti-Spain.” It accused the newly elected government of betraying the core Spanish values 
of monarchism, imperialism, and Catholicism. Throughout his life, Franco and his regime 
cultivated the “myth of the ungovernable Spaniards,” the idea that Spanish nationals could 
                                                 
19 Sara Schatz,“Democracy's Breakdown and the Rise of Fascism: The Case of the 
Spanish Second Republic, 1931-6,” Social History 26.2 (2001): 145–146.  
 
20 Helen Graham, “Community, Nation and State in Republican Spain, 1931-1938,” 
Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities 
(Oxford: Berg, 1996), 133-134.  
 
21 Kenneth N. Medhurst, Government in Spain: The Executive at Work (Oxford: 
Pergamon Press, 1973), 18-20; Clare Mar-Molinero, “The Role of Language in Spanish 
Nation-Building,” Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and 
Conflicting Identities (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1996), 73-75; Michael Alpert, Republican Army 
in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 7-8. 
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not exercise democratic freedoms due to the supposed “fact” they possessed a temperament 
too passionate to maintain law and order.22 The war began on July 17, 1936, when Franco’s 
forces seized control of Morocco and invaded Andalucía. The next morning, he broadcast 
his famous manifesto from the Canary Islands. In it he declared a “state of war” and incited 
Spanish Nationalists and Loyalists (those in favor of strong centralized government and 
the country’s traditional power structures) to rebellion against the “traitorous” Republic.23  
 Both sides recruited international militias. The Falangists, or members of Spain’s 
fascist political party, received aid from Italy and Germany (by early 1937, they had 
approximately 120,000 new troops). The Republic received limited aid from Stalin and the 
International Brigades. These “Brigaders,” now celebrated for their valiant efforts to 
combat the early rise of fascist ideologies in Europe, were comprised of an estimated 
35,000 volunteers from 53 countries. Of this number, some 10,000 worked in 
noncombatant roles, including medical staff, suppliers, and journalists. It is estimated, 
however, that among the soldiers, no more than 20,000 were active at any given time. In 
                                                 
22 Kenneth N. Medhurst, Government in Spain: The Executive at Work (Oxford: 
Pergamon Press, 1973), 23; Marion Roewekamp, “Spain, Europe, Memory and the 
Recuperation of the Past,” Iberoamericana 13.49 (2013): 185; Oxana Shevel, “The Politics 
of Memory in a Divided Society: A Comparison of Post-Franco Spain and Post-Soviet 
Ukraine,” Slavic Review 70.1 (2011): 140; Carolyn P. Boyd, “The Politics of History and 
Memory in Democratic Spain,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 617 (2008): 141-143; Carsten Humlebæk, “Remembering the Dictatorship: 
Commemorative Activity in the Spanish Press on the Anniversaries of the Civil War and 
the Death of Franco,” Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes in Europe: Legacies and 
Lessons from the Twentieth Century, Ed. Jerzy W. Borejsza and Klaus Ziemer (New York: 
Berghan Books, 2006), 495. 
 
23 Francisco Franco in his broadcast “Manifiesto del General Franco al iniciarse el 
movimiento militar,” from Las Palmas, Spain, 1936.  




October 1936, the Republic had assumed the nickname “Gobierno de la Victoria” 
[Government of Victory] and officially organized the “Ejército Popular Regular” (EPR) 
[Professional Popular Army]. This delayed militarization (largely the result of fierce public 
opposition) may have cost the Republic the war, as it was poorly organized in the beginning 
and lacking in central command. Though they did win a number of victories, both large 
and small, it had already become apparent in 1938 that fortune had taken an unfavorable 
turn (though the newspaper did not reflect this trend, a topic of analysis in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis).24  
 The region of Catalonia in northeastern Spain, with Barcelona as its capital, played 
a crucial role in the conflict. Considered a hub of democratic, anarchist, and communist 
forces, Barcelona had flourished under the Republic in a period sometimes termed the 
“Catalan Oasis.” Catalonia finally achieved its long-sought dream of greater autonomy, 
passing laws promoting the use of Catalan language in public affairs and celebrating 
Catalan culture after decades of oppression. This generated a powerful antifascist response 
and an active resistance that lasted until its defeat. Consequently, the fall of the Republic 
in 1939 ultimately proved especially crushing to Catalonia, which had fought particularly 
fiercely in its defense until the bitter end, leaving its population in “a state of physical and 
material defeat and moral and spiritual devastation.”25 Their “patriotic” news publications 
of those years would not resurface until Franco’s death in 1975. 
                                                 
24 Michael Alpert, Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 103. 
 
25  Pelai Pagès i Blanch, War and Revolution in Catalonia, 1936-1939, Trans. 




The Western Tradition of Wartime Journalism 
 This section offers a brief review of the existing literature involving the practice of 
wartime journalism in democratic Western countries, its traits and objectives. A great deal 
has been written on the wartime propaganda of Franco and the Republic, but no research 
has focused on the daily periodicals published throughout the war and utilized as the main 
source of news for locals. In fact, most works containing any reference to Spain’s wartime 
journalism exist in the form of memoirs written by foreign visitors and correspondents, 
such as George Orwell, Ernest Hemingway, and Arthur Koestler. Unfortunately, these 
works, while fascinating in their own right, are not scholarly documents with systematic 
analyses of the periodicals they engaged. Additionally, to date, no analyses have been 
conducted on the wartime coverage of any Spanish newspaper of the period. 
 The little research that has been conducted into the case of the Spanish Civil War 
focuses on several key points: the unreliability of the Republican and Nationalist press, the 
liberal and conservative “myths” defining them, and the immense challenges affecting 
reporters in wartime. Both sides produced propaganda designed to “seize upon isolated 
incidents to make general points” that reinforced their claims.26 Beevor and Figueres, 
however, note profoundly different trends in the activities of fascist and Republican news 
agents. While censors were applied on both sides, Republican reporters were allowed 
relative freedom of movement and the opportunity to voice varied liberal opinions. Fascist 
reporters, on the other hand, were forced to adhere to strict ideological policies and codes 
                                                 
26 Antony Beevor, The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2006), 245. 
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in their accounts, and their activities were closely monitored and restricted at all times.27 
 As previously noted, scholars have observed that “the Spanish Civil War was a 
magnet for foreign correspondents,” resulting in “initial, hasty impressions passed on by 
journalists with little first-hand evidence.”28 This was due, in part, to the fact that in the 
early stages of conflict, “correspondents were rushed into Spain, regardless of whether they 
spoke the language or understood the country’s politics.” Beevor states that it was even 
“customary” to send a reporter to the side a news outlet supported. The New York Times 
and the Chicago Tribune, for example, supported the Republic, while Catholic periodicals 
supported Franco.29 
 As for Spanish war reporters, Figueres points out that they actively participated in 
ideological battle: “from July of 1936 onward, journalists occupied a position of active 
fighting.” Republican journalists “participated actively in the defense of the legality of the 
Republic,” and Nationalist journalists did the same for the military insurgents.30 Most 
interestingly, he notes that the “tone” of Spanish reporters lay at the intersection of literary 
and informative narration.31 In this way, “the chronicles of war that came out of both camps 
                                                 
27 Josep M. Figueres Artigues, “Periodismo de guerra: las crónicas de la guerra civil 
española,” Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico 11 (2005): 284, 289-290; Antony 
Beevor, The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2006), 242. 
 
28 Antony Beevor, The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2006), 81 
 
29 Ibid., 244. 
 
30 Josep M. Figueres Artigues, “Periodismo de guerra: las crónicas de la guerra civil 
española,” Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico 11 (2005): 286. 
 
31 Ibid., 284. 
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were not just descriptive; they also introduced values, concepts, and ideas.”32   
 Though Spain’s Republican newspapers are now appreciated for their efforts, they 
have not escaped criticism altogether. As Orwell observed in 1943: “Early in life I had 
noticed that no event is ever correctly reported in a newspaper, but in Spain for the first 
time, I saw newspaper reports which did not bear any relation to the facts, not even the 
relationship which is implied in an ordinary lie...” 33  Figueres similarly asserts that 
journalism during the Spanish Civil War from all angles involved “disinformation as the 
norm. Information contained in chronicles was not trustworthy…It was merely 
atmospheric.”34  
 It should be noted, however, that wartime journalism is more complex than simply 
“telling the truth,” as human experience is subject to numerous interpretations. BBC war 
correspondent Kate Adie once wrote that “the very nature of war confuses the role of the 
journalist.”35 Indeed, such case studies suggest that inaccuracies and sensationalism may 
be the inevitable staples of wartime journalism, a practice based upon testimonies limited 
by restricted access and scope, life-threatening experiences, and personal risk. In these 
circumstances it proves difficult, if not impossible, to maintain an unbiased view of events. 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 289. 
 
33 Fearghal McGarry, “Irish Newspapers and the Spanish Civil War,” Irish 
Historical Studies 33.129 (2002): 68.  
 
34 Josep M. Figueres Artigues, “Periodismo de guerra: las crónicas de la guerra civil 
española,” Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico 11 (2005): 289. 
 
35 Kate Adie, “Dispatches from the Front: Reporting War,” Contemporary Issues 
in British Journalism (Vauxhall Lectures, Centre for Journalism Studies: Cardiff 




Additionally, journalists face heightened pressures from military, government, and 
commercial organizations, ultimately shaping their coverage.36 In the case of 1930s Spain, 
it proved especially difficult for correspondents to verify facts. They were often forced to 
rely on the emotional or exaggerated accounts of refugees fleeing Nationalist-held regions 
and answered to powerful political figures and organizations. Indeed, as Beevor observes, 
the newspapermen of the Spanish Civil War “were as much affected by the emotions of 
the time as anybody else.”37 
 Many have focused on the unique qualities of wartime journalism in the United 
States and other Anglophone traditions, yet there remains much more to be studied 
concerning international traditions. Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime, for example, 
offers a series of articles on modern case studies, taken primarily from British and 
American accounts, referencing and explaining common strategies utilized in wartime 
reporting from the twentieth century onward.  
 Newspapers and other print publications have long been associated with facilitating 
and promoting social movements, from the dissemination of informative or motivational 
literature to the connecting of communities through a shared source. Even their mastheads 
“announce” a kind of active participation in such events, as evidenced by La Vanguardia’s 
shifting titles over the course of the twentieth century. Tarrow explains: “while newspapers 
circulated the idea of movement, movements expanded the market for print, as people tried 
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to share, if only vicariously–in what was happening around them. By their very mastheads, 
newspapers announced themselves as agents of movement.”38 Always benefitting from the 
speed and nuance of new technologies, newspapers were revolutionized yet again by the 
invention of the camera. With the advent of photography came a new type of war 
documentation, as reporters could capture images of the destruction they sought to describe 
in order to compliment featured stories, a tactic which quickly gained popularity.39 
 However, early examples of photojournalism, such as in the Spanish Civil War, 
remained somewhat narrow in scope and material, as photographers faced numerous 
obstacles: “The first war photographers really didn’t photograph war at all. Because of the 
bulk of their equipment and the length of time it took to make an exposure, they were 
limited to battleground landscapes, posed pictures of fighters, simulated combat, and 
portraits of soldiers prior to battle.”40 Despite these challenges, photography became an 
effective tool in the formatting of publications like La Vanguardia, and likely served as a 
kind of “vérité” technique intended to move and persuade audiences in the darkest 
moments of conflict. Persuasion has been acknowledged as paramount in communication 
strategies, especially in wartime, during which large populations have a vested interest in 
the outcome. For this reason, wartime journalism tends to occupy a special status in public 
perception, resulting in a set of standards for assessment distinct from other media 
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practices. Often glorified to the point of sensationalism, war reporting assumes an 
important role in the mediation of conflict for its capacity to influence mass opinion, a 
concept outlined by Allan and Zelizer in their chapter on the “Rules of Engagement”:  
War reporting...demands that notions of what constitutes good journalistic practice 
be realigned on the basis of different criteria that would typically seem appropriate, 
criteria thrown into stark relief–at times violently so–by challenging circumstances. 
At the same time, war reporting’s positioning as a litmus test for journalism also 
rests on an understanding of its capacity to influence public perceptions.41  
 
 The case of Republican journalism during the Spanish Civil War is unique for the 
fact that it operated in a democratic society battling autocracy over a prolonged period of 
time. War reporting has been studied from the perspectives of foreign correspondents and 
overseas conflict in depth, yet the field of wartime journalism in democracies immediately 
impacted by violence remains overlooked. Beevor’s scholarship, for example, sheds some 
light onto the challenging situations reporters faced, but he does not investigate what 
Republican newspapers (written by native Spaniards) had to say about the conflict. Rather, 
he is concerned with the timeline of events and political developments in 1930s Spain. 
Figueres, meanwhile, provides a compelling overview of the dominant narratives of 
Spanish Civil War chroniclers in the fascist and Republican militias, but his study does not 
extend to the routine wartime coverage of daily periodicals: First, he limits his discussion 
to the first-hand accounts of reporters delivered from the front lines who were directly 
involved in combat. Second, he does not address the shift or evolution of style or content 
in their accounts over the duration of the war.  
 It is my hope, therefore, that this thesis will provide insight into a serious gap in 
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Spanish media history. My research thus contributes to the study of wartime news coverage 
in democratic societies by keying in on the hitherto unstudied case of Catalonia’s most 
prominent newspaper during the Spanish Civil War.  
 
Theory: Framing Analysis 
 Framing theorists have long argued that “framing has important implications for 
political communication,” and that framing has yet to be applied to the fruitful analysis of 
media along the socio-political spectrum.42 This section revolves around three areas of 
discussion: It provides a brief outline of framing analysis theory, its development, and 
present applications; it discusses those aspects of narrative theory relevant to the framing 
analysis conducted in this thesis; and it assesses Foucault’s ideas concerning political 
discourse and their intimate connection to framing analysis. As Kuypers and Entman, in 
particular, have acknowledged, the relationships among framing analysis, narrative, and 
political discourse, however complex, are inevitable as they combine to create and 
influence meaning.43 
 This sort of scholarship concerning historical media offers a number of valuable 
insights that, to my mind, are best suited to the theoretical framework offered by framing 
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analysis. Although the concept of framing, since it was first introduced in the 1950s by 
Gregory Bateson and then “imported” into the social sciences by Erving Goffman in his 
seminal work “Framing Analysis: The Organization of Experience,” has grown to such a 
point that it often acts as a superfluous “buzz” word in communication research, it remains 
to be used more meaningfully in the field of media history and the general structuring of 
news coverage in democratic societies. 44  Framing analysis allows for the effective 
examination of newspapers as it emphasizes the construction and organization of content, 
thus attempting to explain the perceived functions and layout of news media. Whether 
intentional or not, most theorists agree that the media frame issues in a way that highlights 
or emphasizes particular aspects over others. Researchers have moved beyond initial 
framing observations to argue that media sources do in fact tell readers how to consider 
policy and current events, even if mass reactions fall beyond their direct control. Moreover, 
the media act as the primary source for the evaluation of political discourse in society. So 
what better way is there to arrive at an enhanced understanding of the political discourse 
and the role of media in Republican Spain than through the investigation of a popular and 
prolific Spanish newspaper of the period?  
 My use of framing analysis is based upon the ideas of theorists such as Kuypers, 
Entman, Benford and Snow, and Johnston and Noakes and the contributions they have 
made to furthering the application of framing analysis to political discourses and social 
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movements. While the debate continues as to the precise direction of influence between 
news framing and public opinion, a fascinating topic, it fails to contribute to the framing 
analysis conducted in this thesis. I have paid special attention to the concepts foundational 
to the present use of framing analysis and their concept of master frames, as well as the 
terminology of “collective action frames.”45 According to Benford and Snow, collective 
action frames 
Perform an interpretive function by simplifying and condensing aspects of “the 
world out there,” in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and 
constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists. Thus, 
collective action frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire 
and legitimate the activities and campaigns of social movement organizations.46 
 
 My research focuses on those frames present in the historical artifacts as opposed 
to a speculation surrounding the real-life correlation between a series of frames and the 
outcome of a war. Simply put, collective action framing involves “the process of defining 
what is going on in a situation in order to encourage protest” and comprises three primary 
components of identity, agency, and injustice. As Naples, Swidler, and Snow and Benford 
have pointed out, culture plays an important part in this process, as “a person’s social 
experiences are made meaningful by shared components” of particular societal constructs, 
many of which derive from a shared cultural background.47  
 As will be discussed in the next chapters, my research yielded two distinct master 
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collective action frames of analysis I have named: (1) The Spanish Civil War as 
International Conflict frame and (2) The Media as Guardian of Democracy frame. These 
frames collaborated to present the war as part of a greater global crisis, which pitted the 
popular will of the people against that of a brutal dictatorship. The Republic represented a 
just and democratic government and Barcelona’s La Vanguardia represented its trusted 
voice. Noakes and Johnston define a “master frame” as “a more general, but especially 
powerful–in that it evokes powerful cultural symbols–interpretative package.” In this way 
“master frames are linked to cycles of protest–periods of intense social movement activity 
in which the mobilization of various movements overlap in time are often linked to one 
another.”48  
 It is important to note, however, that frames are far from fixed or stable, as they 
tend to develop in response to the matter at hand and evolve accordingly. Furthermore, 
while frames may be cultivated over a given period, they do not necessarily emerge on a 
conscious level, and may take time to operate effectively: “Observers in Western nations 
have noted that framing processes are generally less conscious at the beginning of a 
movement, becoming more strategic as the battle is waged.”49 This statement certainly 
appears true of La Vanguardia, which did not even begin to acknowledge the inevitability 
of war until late July of 1936, nearly two full weeks after Franco delivered his manifesto. 
For this reason, I have presented a brief overview of the emergence and development of 
each frame until their ultimate maturity in 1938. In this way, the aforementioned frames 
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became clearer, sharper, more dominant, and more poignant as the war progressed, even to 
the point of sentimentality by the end:  
Although framing processes are “active, ongoing, and continuously evolving” and 
no person or organization can fully control this process, the role of social movement 
entrepreneurs in the construction of collective action frames is crucial...If we 
acknowledge that frames are constructed from a cultural fabric and that they have 
a specific content, we can describe the ‘materials’ that make them up-that is, the 
components of an interpretive schema...To explain their actions and to motivate 
participants, movements must produce interpretive packages that explain a range 
of problems in relatively narrow terms, highlight some issues, and ignore others. 
The process of assembling these packages is historically specific, but there are 
patterns across movements in the kinds of materials assembled.50  
 
 Framing may be used to perform several important functions: to keep the public 
informed of major events and guide their interests, to help make sense of complicated 
affairs, and to promote political/ideological agendas in a more persuasive and palatable 
way. According to Williams, “movements must produce rhetorical packages that explain 
their claims within extant, culturally legitimate boundaries.”51 The two master frames I 
explore encompassed those boundaries, communicating important cultural and social 
values and promoting a sense of fellowship to enhance collective action in Republican 
Barcelona until the end of the war.52  
 Framing analysis, by nature, requires an understanding of culture, context, 
narrative, and discourse for they interact with one another in order to create meaning. As 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 7. 
 
51 R. H. Williams and Timothy J. Kubal, “Movement Frames and the Cultural 
Environment: Resonance, Failure, and the Boundaries of the Legitimate,” Research in 
Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change 21 (1999): 247.  
 
52 “Republican Barcelona” refers to Barcelona as part of the popularly elected 




Kuypers argues: “Frames are central organizing ideas within a narrative account of an issue 
or event.” 53 Entman agrees: “We can define framing as the process of culling a few 
elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among 
them to promote a particular interpretation.”54 Because frames emerge as a set of patterns 
and highlights via language and content, both of which are deeply embedded in the socio-
political circumstances and cultural realities of a particular group of a particular time 
period, they push the researcher to evaluate these “interpretive packages” within a bigger, 
more complex arena. 55  As Tannen writes regarding “frames and the communication 
process,” “meaning is never totally determinate but rather is…a joint production.” 56 
Moreover, communication scholars have pointed out that “framing also is a process based 
in and bound by culture, and it reflects how forces and groups in society try to shape public 
discourse about an issue.”57 
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 Frames are designed to invoke “images that are rich, distinctive, and memorable 
for the ways they crystallize understanding.”58 They incorporate metaphors and narratives 
to convey messages that resonate with their audience in a particular way. They offer a 
simplified interpretation of events to facilitate public comprehension of a complex and 
ever-changing world. They cultivate a sense of clarity and consistency to mediate the chaos 
and anxiety of conflict.59 Frames serve to produce what Lippmann terms the “pseudo-
environment,” “for the real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting 
for direct acquaintance.”60 Entman similarly explains that “through repetition, placement, 
and reinforcing associations with each other, the words and images that comprise the frame 
render one basic interpretation more readily discernible, comprehensible, and memorable 
than others.’”61 
 I should clarify that my notion of discourse derives from Foucault’s discussion of 
the concept. In his introduction to The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on 
Language, he writes that “the most radical discontinuities are the breaks effected by a work 
of theoretical transformation ‘which establishes a science by detaching it from the ideology 
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of its past by revealing this past as ideological.’”62 In advancing discourse beyond the 
mechanical aspects of language to embrace the institutionalized patterns of societal 
structures over time, Foucault is among the first to recognize the importance of analyzing 
the perceived “ruptures” and “interruptions” in the supposed continuous progression of 
human history and knowledge.63 As Noakes and Johnson also argue: “all social movements 
must ‘break the frames’ of quiescence and acceptance of the status quo that characterizes 
everyday life.” 64  The proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic in 1931 and the 
ensuing civil war, which represented a drastic break from the long-held Spanish traditions 
of church and monarchy, as expressed in their political discourse, serve as an example of 
one such interruption. 
 According to Foucault, knowledge inhabits a social structure that changes along 
with the power shifts that inevitably occur over time. He defines discourse as 
…the notion of “spirit,” which enables us to establish between the simultaneous or 
successive phenomena of a given period a community of meanings, symbolic links, 
an interplay of resemblance and reflexion, or which allows the sovereignty of 
collective consciousness to emerge as the principle of unity and explanation…As 
soon as one questions that unity, it loses its self-evidence; indicates itself, constructs 
itself, only on the basis of a complex field of discourse.65  
 
In this way, political discourse may be perceived as the patterns of language surrounding 
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the political scene of a given society at a given time. After all, communication scholars 
tend to agree that “the choice of language is strictly determined by the hierarchical social 
structure,” so previous editions of newspapers such as La Vanguardia thus preserve for 
media historians a kind of screenshot of the political discourses of the past.66 
 Johnson-Cartee makes this the central point of her book News Narratives and News 
Framing: Constructing Political Reality, in which she argues that “knowledge is socially 
constructed, and the news media, in particular, play an increasingly powerful role in the 
process of constructing political reality.”67 This necessitates the construction of frames, as 
frames serve to organize a narrative designed to communicate a series of events within the 
context of a specific culture and place. Intentionally or not, then, media sources distort said 
events according to a simplified or strategic interpretation of the social and political reality 
they inhabit. While narratives are always present in every human artifact, times of crisis 
give rise to especially provocative rhetoric, as they tend to emerge out of perceived societal 
transformations that threaten established traditions. As Nathan Crick states: “The language 
of ‘event’ provides a way to highlight the fact that rhetoric always thrives in a certain 
eventful environment whose totality is always beyond our powers of representation, an 
environment in which events are surprising, unanticipatable, and always entail a reversal 
of a relationship of forces.”68 Hence, those periods that Foucault terms “ruptures” in the 
grand narrative of history produce the most compelling rhetorical structures of all, as they 
                                                 
66 Suwako Watanabe, “Cultural Differences in Framing,” Framing in Discourse, 
Ed. Deborah Tannen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 180. 
 
67 Karen S. Johnson-Cartee, News Narratives and News Framing: Constructing 
Political Reality (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 147. 
 
68 Nathan Crick, “Rhetoric and Events,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 47.3 (2014): 254.  
  
26 
reveal profound societal transformations that challenge the status quo. The Spanish Civil 
War, a conflict which erupted in the form of a campaign intended to counteract the Spanish 
Revolution of 1930, is a notable example of one such rupture. 
 In accordance with this line of thought, scholars have come to understand that 
media play a central role in the evolution of discourse, as  
Media are more than merely passive and transparent conveyors of information. 
They play an active role in shaping our understanding of the past, in “mediating” 
between us (readers, viewers, listeners) and past experiences, and hence in setting 
the agenda for future acts of remembrance within society…media are themselves 
caught up in a dynamic of their own…media are always ‘emergent’ rather than 
stable, and technology for meaning-making and networking emerge in relation to 
each other and in reaction to each other.69 
 
Consequently, media construct narratives within specially designed frames to convey 
information, and in so doing, influence interpretations of the past, the present, and the 
future. Journalism, then, as a product of human agency, is similarly ideological in nature.70 
Moreover, as Johnson-Cartee and McNair contend, the news itself functions as narrative.71 
McNair writes: “Journalism, therefore, like any other narrative which is the work of human 
agency, is essentially ideological–a communicative vehicle for the transmission to an 
audience (intentionally or otherwise) not just of facts but of the assumptions, attitudes, 
beliefs and values of its maker(s), drawn from and expressive of a particular world-view.”72 
According to this view, news narratives are the product of a “multilayered and 
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multidirectional process” known as our “mediated political reality.”73 
 Narrative has been recognized by increasing numbers of communication scholars 
“as a significant human artifact.”74 Fisher states: “the idea of human beings as storytellers 
indicates the generic form of all symbol composition; it holds that symbols are created and 
communicated ultimately as stories meant to give order to human experience and to induce 
others to dwell in them to establish ways of living in common.”75 It is important to note, 
however, that the narrative of events and the reality of events, though connected, remain 
distinct from one another. Narrative certainly helps to contribute an understanding of 
experience, but just like the social structures and institutions that govern our lives, it is 
human-made and as such, artificial.  
 Narrative and discourse maintain a close relationship, depending upon one another 
to mature and flourish. Consequently, narratives may be found at the center of every 
discourse, as discourse involves the study of systems of language and thought and the 
conversations they cultivate. Indeed, it is difficult to assess one aspect without the other, 
and each contributes to the shaping of cultural and political discourse. In the context of 
political discourse, narrative must generally be framed in simplistic enough terms to 
persuade the public of a point of view. For this reason, news narratives often lack the subtle 
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or multidimensional frames of literary narratives.76 Political narratives, like all narratives, 
are primarily composed of four parts: characters, setting, plot, and theme. These 
components are, in turn, born out of the political discourse of the era and are packaged for 
the masses in a series of interpretive frames which serve to make sense of the otherwise 
elusive human experience: 
The rise, fall, and marginalization of stories as constitutive parts of the dynamics 
of remembering have thus merged as key issues in memory studies. This turn 
towards memorial dynamics demands among other things new insight into the 
factors which allow certain collective memories to become hegemonic or, 
conversely, allow hitherto marginalized memories to gain prominence in the public 
arena…77 
 
Public opinion is constantly in flux as the ideological narrative foundation shifts with major 
events. In war, when the public tends to feel threatened in an existential way, ruptures in 
the fabric of political discourse become frequent and inevitable.  
 Framing in mass communication has yet to be established as a consistent (or, at 
least, harmonious) body of ideas for constructive discussion in the field, yet it is more or 
less unified on a single front in the assertion that “framing appears to be a central power in 
the democratic process, for political elites control the framing of issues.”78 As Entman 
articulates “whatever its specific use, the concept of framing consistently offers a way to 
describe the power of a communicating text.”79 This thesis upholds this premise, but 
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further engages the concept by studying the capacity of media frames to “reflect the play 
of power and boundaries of discourse over an issue.”80 I subsequently adhere to Myra 
Macdonald’s applications of Foucault to media discourse, thus expanding these 
applications to historical media.81 Like Macdonald, my definition of discourse refers to “a 
system of communicative practices that are integrally related to wider social and cultural 
practices, and that help to construct specific frameworks of thinking” so that I might 
contribute an understanding of the “process of making meaning.”82 She argues that “the 
merit of the Foucauldian approach lies in underlining how many of these [media] decisions 
rest on routine responses that are informed by culturally and socially acceptable ways of 
thinking.” 83  Because Foucault “insists on investigating the operation of discourse in 
specific times and situations, adopting a methodology that is essentially historical,” my 
study involves a similarly Foucauldian perspective. 84  Foucault’s seminal ideas are 
committed to revealing “the interaction between discursive change and the operation of 
knowledge and power” so as “to do justice to the specific twists and turns of historical 
development,” making his notions of discourse in times of “rupture” central to my 
investigation of a crucial instance of political communication in Spanish history.85    
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 In agreement with Norman Fairclough’s conception that as scholars we should 
“concentrate our attention upon changes in the societal order of discourse during a 
particular period,” I analyze the frames presented by a Barcelona newspaper during the 
Second Spanish Republic, a brief era in Spanish history that defied all traditional notions 
of the past and enacted a vital break with Spain’s most prominent power structures and 
institutions.86 Consequently, my use of framing theory departs from conventional analyses 
in two ways. First, I have applied it to a single newspaper in the distant past. Existing 
framing analyses in the communication literature involve numerous periodicals’ and other 
news outlets’ coverage of controversial events in the present or the recent past, often 
discerning their comparative elements, while my analysis focuses exclusively on the 
coverage of La Vanguardia in the years 1936-1939.87 Second, I have used framing analysis 
to observe the organization of media content in relation to the shifting power structures of 
an important period of sudden change and instability in Spanish history. I expand upon the 
subjects of journalism history and my methodology in the following section. 
 
Methodology: Journalism History 
 This thesis examines the frames created by a specific Spanish newspaper (La 
Vanguardia) during the Spanish Civil War as it was happening. After all, communication 
historians such as myself seek not to construct new narratives based upon the 
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conglomeration of disparate materials; we seek to identify those narratives already penned 
by contemporaries at the time of conflict.  
 I read hundreds of editions of La Vanguardia (all of which are free and accessible 
through their online “hemeroteca” or database) from the start of the war on July 17, 1936 
to the fall of Barcelona on January 25, 1939. I focused on the first five pages of each 
edition, as these pages contained the day’s most important headlines and the sections on 
national and international news. I went through La Vanguardia day by day, making sure to 
pay special attention to dates of particular significance (i.e., major battles and military 
campaigns). 
 I identified frames by adhering to Entman’s method of pinpointing “the presence 
or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, 
and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments.”88 In 
this way, I looked for metaphors, concepts, and visual images that consistently appeared in 
the editions’ top articles, photos, and cartoons.89 Consequently, this thesis sets out to detect 
and to evaluate those frames constructed by Barcelona’s La Vanguardia in wartime, how 
they operated over the course of the conflict, and how they shaped meaning. 
 In agreement with communication history methodologists Sloan and Stamm that 
“in communication history research, there has been too much reliance on secondary 
sources…on other historians rather than on the historical subjects themselves,” I have 
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incorporated numerous excerpts from La Vanguardia itself, as “primary sources are the 
raw materials of history” so that the audience may read the newspaper in literal translation 
without having to depend exclusively on my interpretation of the text.90 I have translated 
all excerpts myself in order to ensure their accuracy and integrity. As Kuypers 
unequivocally states, “the best framing analyses allow the rhetorical artifacts to speak for 
themselves.”91 
 Using other one-year studies by W. Joseph Campbell, Felipe Fernández-Armesto, 
David McCullough, David Howarth, and Lloyd and Dorothy Moote as my model, I elected 
to place my emphasis on the final year of the war in order to illustrate the intensity of news 
coverage during that period and the insights it offered into the concept of communicating 
resistance in a losing cause.92 Single-year studies have enjoyed quite a bit of recognition 
in subfields of history, appreciated for their ability to “clarify trends, issues, and 
developments that otherwise might be obscured in the sweep of historiography…The in-
depth quality of a year study can identify and bring depth and fresh understanding to what 
                                                 
90 David Sloan and Michael Stamm, Historical methods in Communication, Third 
Edition (Northport: Vision Press, 2010), 194-196.  
 
91 Jim A. Kuypers, “Framing Analysis,” The Art of Rhetorical Criticism, Ed. Jim 
A. Kuypers (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2005), 207. 
 
92  W. Joseph Campbell, “Fresh Methodologies Could Invigorate Journalism 
History,” Clio: Newsletter of the History Division of the Association for Education in 
Journalism and Mass Communication 42.3 (Spring 2008): 6-8. 
http://aejmc.us/history/wpcontent/uploads/sites/5/2012/12/08springclio.pdf;  
Felipe Fernández-Armesto, 1492: The Year the World Began (Harper Collins e-Books, 
2009); David G. McCullough, 1776 (Barcelona: Belacqva, 2006); David Howarth, 1066: 
The Year of the Conquest (New York: Penguin Books, 1981); A. Lloyd Moote and Dorothy 
C. Moote, The Great Plague The Story of London’s Most Deadly Year (Baltimore: Johns 




is often regarded as familiar and commonplace.”93 Certain years are considered pivotal in 
the greater scheme of world history. While contemporary audiences may not have 
perceived their experiences as pertaining to a specific or finite period of time, historians 
can identify them in hindsight. Consequently, single-year studies offer a number of 
advantages that studies concerning more expansive durations may not; primarily, that is, 
the detailed exploration of a single year in its full complexity without allowing it to be 
summarized as simply one year among many, lost in a blur of decades or even centuries. It 
is my hope that by paying special attention to 1938, a seminal year in Spanish history, I 
have contributed to a deeper understanding of Republican Barcelona in the face of defeat.  
 When addressing the subject of history in any field, one must first face a number 
of impossibilities. For one, historians are limited in our reach, as we are granted only 
incomplete access to the past. We can merely grasp at the surviving documents, such as 
periodicals, magazines, posters, advertisements, memoirs, and testimonials of an era 
distanced from us in time and space. A common method utilized by historians is to impose 
upon the materials at hand a particular narrative that allows us to make sense of the human 
experience. For this reason I have devoted a brief explanation of the complex, if inevitable, 
relationships among framing analysis, narrative, and political discourse. Therefore, it is the 
duty of media historians to address past narratives within the context of their time rather 
than attempt to transplant them into the present by assuming that their meanings are fixed 
or stable. As Felipe Fernández-Armesto writes in his introduction to 1492: The Year the 
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World Began, “historians’ job is not to explain the present but to understand the past–to 
recapture a sense of what it felt like to live in it.”94  
Although at moments in contention with one another, media historians have 
addressed the highly interdisciplinary nature of journalism history and the need for the 
field to expand, restructure, and invigorate. This section offers an overview of 
journalism history, its mission to provide valuable insights into the role and foci of 
historical media, and the methodology I have utilized to ensure the highest possible 
level of accuracy and integrity concerning my contribution to the field. 
In “The Problem of Journalism History,” Carey calls for a “cultural history of the 
press.” More specifically, he describes the need for a narrative that recovers “past forms 
of imagination, of historical consciousness” and urges media historians to reimagine, if 
not reconstruct, how it felt “to live and act in a particular period of human history.”95 
He connects these ideas specifically to media history by arguing that “when we study 
the history of journalism we are principally studying a way in which men in the past 
have grasped reality.” He summarizes “the central and as yet unwritten history of 
journalism is the history of the idea of a report.”96 In defining the press as the idea of a 
report, he reinforces his argument for the need for a cultural history which seeks to 
understand past communities’ understanding of and experience of journalism. Carey 
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holds journalism to be dualistic in nature, both a literary and industrial art. To this effect, 
he even recalls Proust: “the central story in journalism has been largely banished from 
our remembrance of things past.”   
Sloan and Stamm, meanwhile, in their third chapter of Historical Methods in 
Communication titled “The Fundamentals of Good History,” seek to lay out the 
appropriate groundwork for the field. They insist that in order for journalism history to 
rise in the world of academia, they must first understand the principles of quality 
historical research more generally. They go on to examine the standards that ought to 
be in place for communication historians in order to pursue “excellence.” 97 While 
acknowledging the difficulty of defining “good history,” they outline seven criteria: (1) 
topic definition (the shaping of boundaries and approximation of material that ensures 
“continuity of content” and a proper sense of time and space); (2) bibliographic 
soundness (the gathering of a variety of sources, including authorities on relevant 
subjects and periodical literature); (3) research (as “evidence is the grist of history,” 
researchers must find, evaluate, and reconstruct it or a “segment of the past based upon 
it”); (4) accuracy (the investigation into the “reality” of the time); (5) explanation (the 
“explication of sources” and generalizations/interpretation of findings; (6) historical 
understanding (“having understanding of the circumstances and personalities pertaining 
to a study”); and (7) writing (the construction of a quality and captivating narrative 
which upholds the standards of both good history and good writing). Journalism 
historians are expected to be truthful to the greatest possible extent, to “understand the 
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past on its own terms,” and to “demonstrate judgment that is honest, perceptive, and 
balanced.”98 
Others split from the “historical imagination” and “cultural history” ideals in 
interesting ways, at points outright contesting them. In “The Paradoxes of Journalism 
History,” Conboy states that “in order to extricate journalism from broader media 
history, we need to develop better ways of understanding the generic characteristics of 
journalism over time and across geopolitical space” and then outlines what he terms to 
be the “five paradoxes of journalism history.”99 These paradoxes are: (1) “journalism is 
not a fixed range of practices and there is little consensus about its essential nature”; (2) 
the past practices of journalism can serve to help us understand the future of journalism, 
as well as its present; (3) journalism needs to “develop specific understandings of 
journalism within national contexts…to consider how it has formed and mutated over 
the centuries as a global phenomenon”; (4) “the paradox of the popular” (that is, the 
complex and contradictory relationship of its vested interest in the public audience that 
stimulated its beginnings and development though which may now be the primary threat 
to its survival); and (5) the incorporation of new technologies into current practices, 
rather than allowing those technologies to stimulate “innovative impetus.”100  
Marzolf, Conboy, Hampton, and Schudson thus argue the need for journalism 
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historians to set a bold structural framework for the study of journalism history so that 
such scholars might consistently achieve standards of excellence that invigorate, 
cultivate, and elevate the field. To this end, they identify a number of challenges facing 
its development, such as the inevitable harsh criticism of shifting to new methods over 
traditional approaches, the need for basic resources such as proper funding and 
technology, and the general philosophical paradoxes effecting historical scholarship at 
all levels. 
Though the authors disagree on the requirements of future journalism history 
scholarship, they all overwhelmingly agree on the need for the discipline’s complete 
renovation, as well as the crucial importance of acquiring an “understanding” of 
journalism history in order to recognize and appreciate its present practice and future 
potential. Carey argues the need for better writing and greater imagination among 
historians so as to gain respect and a wider audience, while Schudson and Conboy focus 
first and foremost on the need for stronger systematical methods for its framework in 
order to tackle the key paradoxes influencing its premise.  
I have thus attempted to satisfy these demands and to address the current “gaps” 
in the study of journalism history for the fact that journalism has played–and continues 
to play–an important role in the organization and development of democratic societies. 
As Robert W. Desmond wrote in the preface to his The Information Process, “the press 
provides a service to the public and at the same time is recording what will become 
history.” Moreover, he argues that this essentially makes them “the first historians” and 
that “the history of the press itself is a part of the social history of mankind in his search 
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for information and understanding.”101  
For this reason, I have utilized the “bottom-up” approach to historical research 
methods. That is, I approached the archives and all primary sources without a 
preconceived notion or theory of what I would–or should–find. While it is humanly 
impossible, of course, to assess anything with a truly pure or untainted mind, I did not 
assume beforehand that my research would conform to any particular theory or 
framework. I have done my best to fulfill those standards outlined by Sloan and Stamm 
who state that “interpretation should not be predetermined. The good historian does not 
set out with a theory and marshal facts to fit it.” In this way, “The best history is always 
a search for truth…Historians should gather all the relevant facts and then ask what 
conclusions may be drawn from them.”102  
According to Entman, “frames can be detected by probing for particular words 
and visual images that consistently appear in a narrative and convey thematically 
consistent meanings across media and time.”103 Frames can be either generic or issue-
specific, and both are detectable via their repeated usage of particular themes.104 In this 
thesis I observe Kuypers’ approach which “begins inductively by looking for themes 
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that reside within new narratives across time and then determining how those themes 
are framed.”105 As Levin also explains, “the reason themes are taken as a measure of 
the presence of frames is the difficulty of finding a completely developed frame in a 
single press release. Frames are built across a series of news media articles, and not all 
elements are present in any single article.”106 In this way, I identified a number of 
themes consistently present in La Vanguardia’s coverage and subsequently traced their 
emergence and development in the years 1936-1939. My research revealed that these 
themes, which I have organized into their corresponding frames of The Spanish Civil 
War as International Conflict frame and The Media as Guardian of Democracy frame, 
emerged early on but became especially profound and revealing during the final year of 
Barcelona’s involvement in the conflict (January 1938–January 1939).  
 Throughout this thesis I follow what is known as the public discourse or social 
movement approach to framing, an approach which “treats the news media mostly as a 
‘carrier’ for frames promoted by public agents and considers media content to be an 
indicator of public discourse.”107   This is not to say that the media lack agency. In treating 
the media as a “carrier” for frames, I emphasize (in accordance with Kuypers) that the 
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media do not operate in a vacuum, but are influenced by an extant body of ideas and social 
practices that shape their communicative functions and processes. In accordance with this 
method, the next chapters provide analyses of the evolution of two major frames found in 
the source text: first, the Spanish Civil War as International Conflict frame, in which the 
Spanish Civil War was framed in terms of a global battle for democracy as opposed to a 
simple military uprising; and second, the Media as Guardian of Democracy frame, in which 
La Vanguardia framed itself as a pillar of democratic fortitude for the sustenance of a new 
and egalitarian Spain.  
 In both chapters, I examine and explain their connection to the turning points of the 
war, their cultural and political implications, and the way they package key revolutionary 
messages that reflect those “ruptures” in the established power structures described by 
Foucault. Historians of all disciplines tend to share the assertion that “the historical 
narrative, a mixture of storytelling and explanation based on evidence and intuition, is one 
of the oldest forms of investigation that have characterized the study of humankind.”108 In 
so doing, this thesis embodies a cultural history of Barcelona under siege in the final year 
of the Spanish Civil War, now recognized as the conflict to set the stage for World War II. 
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THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AS INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FRAME  
 
Introduction 
 Though officially declared a civil war by both Spaniards and foreigners at the outset 
of armed conflict in July 1936, La Vanguardia framed it as a global battle for democratic 
liberties.   This chapter analyzes the newspaper’s framing of the Spanish Civil War not as 
a civil war but as an international conflict. This frame is established through the repetition 
of two major themes: (1) it claims the existence of a unified Spanish identity and (2) it 
emphasizes Barcelona’s key position in the war. In so doing, this frame highlights the 
perspective that Catalonia makes up a vital and integral part of Spain, and that Barcelona, 
as its capital, exerts a powerful and unique influence over world affairs. The first section 
traces the emergence of this theme in 1936-1937, while the other two sections provide a 
detailed investigation of the evolution and profound articulation of The Spanish Civil War 
as International Conflict Frame over the course of 1938-1939. 
 
Emergence and Development 
 From the beginning of the war in 1936, La Vanguardia consistently referred to the 
Falangists in the following terms: “los rebeldes” [the rebels], “las fascistas” [the fascists], 
and occasionally even “los extranjeros” [the foreigners]. Meanwhile, the terms it applied 
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to the Republic’s armies included “leales” [loyalists], “republicanos” [Republicans], and 
“españoles” [Spaniards]. It frequently framed the Republic as the “legitimate government,” 
while framing the Falangists, the Spanish forces commanded by Francisco Franco, as 
“illegitimate rebels,” “fascists,” and “tyrants.” Furthermore, articles referring to Franco and 
his supporters were closely intertwined with the names of Mussolini and Hitler in order to 
emphasize their transparent alliance. Every wartime edition included an international 
section, labeled “Extranjero” [Foreign], which delivered news pertaining to the agreements 
among European countries, their increasingly hostile relations, and the “exposure” of Nazi 
aid sent to Franco’s Nationalists despite Hitler’s assurances to the contrary. One such 
headline from November 21, 1936 read: “The British Press unmasks yet again the direct 
aid of the Nazis to the Spanish Rebels.”109  
 La Vanguardia defined the Spanish Civil War as a war waged against Spain from 
all sides, its prized Republic under siege from well beyond its borders in articles with 
headlines such as “Spain Before The World,” “The Invading Troops,” “The People and the 
Army Against the Invaders,” “Our War for Independence,” and warnings against “the 
intervention of foreign fascism.”110 It documented Italian and German attacks on Spanish 
nationals and pleaded for the assistance of democratic nations such as Britain, France, and 
the United States. To emphasize the international dimension of the war it contained notices 
and messages from foreign diplomats and soldiers fighting in the famed International 
Brigades. For example, a brief article titled “A Greeting From Bulgaria” printed October 
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22, 1936 included the note:  
We, Bulgarian soldiers of a regiment stationed near the capital, have followed the 
course of events in Spain with great interest. We do not go a single moment without 
remembering the heroic fight that the Spanish people sustain against the rebel 
generals. We wish to send our revolutionary greeting to those that on the front 
defend democracy against fascism, taking up arms for the sustenance and liberty of 
their children. We know that your fight is also the fight of the world’s proletariats 
against the invader, fascism, and that your triumph shall also be ours.111  
La Vanguardia frequently featured messages of this nature quoting sympathetic foreigners 
who supported their cause. In so doing, it highlighted the intricate interdependency of 
international affairs in the modern age and linked the fight for Spain to the greater fight for 
the survival of liberal ideals worldwide. 
 La Vanguardia also featured major headlines welcoming and honoring the 
International Brigades and other foreign volunteers. The paper thus framed fascism as a 
kind of disease spreading across Europe, threatening to eradicate liberal values. It 
suggested that if the Republic were to fall, the sickness would infect still more countries. 
The paper maintained that Spain was merely the first battleground in the lead up to a second 
world war:  
And so Spain has been converted into a field of military maneuvers and 
experimentation for greater future horrors still to come, for a host of mortalities a 
hundred times what is being produced within our borders. As Spain bleeds out, her 
national body covered head to toe in injuries; as Franco threatens to multiply 
bombings and to leave not a single stone unturned; as dozens of thousands of 
Spanish lives are lost and incalculable riches destroyed...112 
 
Such headlines were probably intended to increase anti-Franco sentiments among 
Barcelona’s citizens by pointing out the lies and abuses of Fascist countries, but also 
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functioned as a warning to the rest of the free world that fascism could not be trusted:  
The Operations of International Fascism Attempt to Deal a Blow to Collective 
Security: Registers a strong reaction in the European circles opposed to the Italo-
German attitude. The “Pravda” claims that the Interventionists violate the 
international agreements and transform diplomatic relations into a farce.113  
 
 In this way, La Vanguardia revealed a striking awareness of its large and diverse 
audience. Its director clearly recognized that, as Barcelona’s leading newspaper (and one 
disseminated so close to the French border, no less), La Vanguardia was a point of interest 
to the international community, and so was closely followed by foreign nationals as well 
as the native Spaniards for whom it was originally intended. From early on the Republic 
realized that it stood little chance of winning the war without foreign intervention. Many 
of these articles, therefore, intended to persuade other, more powerful democratic nations 
such as the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Canada to join the Republican 
cause. In an example from November 8, 1936, the same day that Madrid received its first 
battalion of international volunteers (others had arrived in Albacete in October):114  
The Republic Speaks: Madison Square Garden is one of the largest stadiums in the 
world...The Spain of the people went to speak to the people of New York crowding 
into Madison Square Garden. The people of New York, so indifferent to everything 
foreign, responded en masse to learn about Spain, to applaud Spain, to raise money 
for Spain. I tell you this, proletariats of Catalonia and of Spain, that nowhere in the 
world have you better or more enthusiastic friends than in North America.115  
 
Such articles likely served two purposes: (1) they gave Catalonians a sense of hope (though 
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false) that the United States might come to their aid, thus cultivating a kind of fervor 
intended to sustain a strong and unified resistance to rebel insurgents, and (2) they urged 
Americans to join the fight against Fascism by appealing to popular roots rather than 
government officials. Recruitment remains perhaps the most “crucial task for social 
movements,” and few studies have explored how framing may influence a movement’s 
ability to attract participants. 116  While the Republic drew in thousands of American 
volunteers, it was never able to garner the support it so desperately needed from the United 
States Government, which perceived it as a symptom of the Marxist Uprisings in Eastern 
Europe. 
 More than appealing to potential allies, however, La Vanguardia went so far as to 
respond directly to the “lies” propagated by Spain’s “enemies.” On one occasion, it 
appears, Italian diplomats in Geneva requested that Spain depend less on international 
arms, citing its “proclamation” that Spain refused to “eliminate” foreign elements from the 
war. Italian officials consequently implied that the Republic’s defense was comprised 
mainly of international brigades, as if the Falangists consisted primarily of Spanish 
nationals by comparison. On October 2, 1936 and again on October 12, 1937, La 
Vanguardia printed articles addressing outright these claims before the international 
community. In the first, it demanded that Italy and Germany keep out of the war and cease 
exporting arms and soldiers to Franco.117 In the second, it insisted that Republican Spain 
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had never made any such statement.118 The paper went on to argue that the Republic would 
be happy to dismiss the foreign militias fighting alongside them should the fascists agree 
to do the same. In this way, the newspaper countered Italo-Fascist claims by reiterating the 
extent of their involvement in the conflict.  
 Consequently, the master frame discussed at length in this section functioned as a 
primarily diagnostic frame, intended to present a new interpretation of events and identify 
causes. 119 In this case, it redefined the term “civil war,” generally involving a purely 
internal or national matter, as a global crisis. La Vanguardia thus “diagnosed” the problem 
as fascism and suggested that the only “cure” was to defeat Franco in Spain, the earlier the 
better. This frame which emerged in the earliest stages of conflict markedly intensified so 
that by 1938, every edition of the newspaper printed articles explicitly arguing against the 
“foreign invasion of Spain.”120 
 As previously mentioned, 1938 proved a difficult year for Spain. The war worsened 
as critical battles were lost, fortress cities submitted to fascist rule, and scores of soldiers 
died at the front to no avail. Hunger plagued the nation and thousands succumbed to 
dehydration, pernicious anemia, and other conditions resulting from malnutrition.121 The 
Catalan Offensive was set to begin and refugees fled in record numbers to the stronghold 
of Barcelona. No one, it seemed, was safe, even if far removed from the direct impact of 
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violence. Not only did Spaniards fear Franco’s militias and his allies, but also the many 
left-wing factions that divided the Republic. Communists, socialists, anarchists, democrats, 
and progressives bitterly fought one another for political power and influence, causing 
suspicion and leading to numerous arrests, denouncements, and executions as they refused 
to unite beneath a single banner. 122  Combined, such conditions certainly painted a 
terrifying picture of the devastation of a war they would not win. La Vanguardia, however, 
painted a very different picture in its coverage. It praised a unified Republican front, a 
series of resounding military victories, and a strong sense of kinship with Madrid.  
 
 Theme One: A Unified Identity, “Catalonia is Spain” 
 To this day Spain remains a highly divided nation, encompassing seven official 
languages and fifty provinces. Officially unified during the Reconquista period in the 
fifteenth century, peripheral regions such as Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country 
have continuously resisted centralized power, seeking out greater autonomy (and 
independence) from Castilla y León.123 To this effect, Catalonia has staged a number of 
revolts against the Spanish Government throughout the centuries, though its fight for 
independence today remains largely peaceful. 124  “The trouble with Barcelona,” as a 
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Spanish statesman once argued, “is that once or twice in every century we have to send an 
army to besiege her from Castile.”125 It is unsurprising, therefore, that Barcelona should be 
remembered as a leader of Catalan nationalism and the secessionist movements presently 
shaping Spanish politics. 
 In the case of the Spanish Civil War, however, Catalonia acted as one of the elected 
government’s greatest allies with Barcelona playing a major role in the conflict, politically 
and militarily. La Vanguardia made a point of emphasizing this friendship between 
Barcelona and Madrid, both highly symbolic capital cities in their respective regions that 
were historically at odds with one another. In fact, each edition dedicated an entire section 
of the paper to Madrid, its news, announcements, and events. On multiple occasions it 
asserted that Madrid embodied the true spirit of revolution, selflessly aiding the war effort 
and making enormous sacrifices. In an update on January 21, 1938: 
Madrid is the archetype of this “normality” in the extraordinary. In Madrid one 
lives the war, one does not hide from it or push it way, but rather confronts it, crude 
and magnificent, in all its splendid and savage sincerity. Conscious of the danger, 
sure in its resistance, its fortitude energized to the utmost, but without its inhabitants 
or defenders becoming intoxicated by sensationalism or with artificial 
excitement.126 
 
By this point, those living in Madrid had witnessed the war firsthand. Air raids regularly 
stormed the city, supplies dwindled, the security of such prized relics as those situated in 
the Prado fell into uncertainty, and the lines back to Barcelona became increasingly 
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difficult to navigate, as the fascists conquered more and more territory.127 La Vanguardia 
clearly sympathized with Madrid, understanding that Barcelona would soon face similar 
challenges and that the fall of Madrid would spell certain disaster for the Republic. In a 
faded, mostly illegible, column from January 7, it argued: “War is difficult, comrade, 
distinguished artists. Madrid is truthfully a glorious and heroic city, thanks to the blood 
that has been spilled.”128 The same day it featured an ironic illustration appearing to “sugar-
coat” the conflict in Madrid, as if to poke fun at the often grandiose, embellished depictions 
of war. 
 The image, literally titled “The Sugar-coated Madrid,” features a crowd of people 
staring stoically into space behind a woman firing a canon.129 In emphasizing war as a dirty 
business, La Vanguardia presented the Spanish Civil War as a necessary evil, a step to be 
taken on the way to the establishment of a kind of socialist utopia. The significance of this 
statement and accompanying illustration should not be overlooked. Though Franco led his 
first insurrection in Morocco and Andalusia in July 1936, proclaiming his manifesto from 
The Canary Islands the next morning, the Republic took over two months to militarize its 
forces officially. This was largely due to fierce public opposition and the government 
hesitancy to announce the imminency of a civil war. Socialists, communists, and anarchists 
alike tended to hold antiwar stances, and it was not until fascism proved a serious enough 
threat that they began to organize a strategic Republican defense. Moreover, early efforts 
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to militarize lacked unity and central command, leading to various obstacles that critically 
delayed development.130  
 La Vanguardia, portraying itself as the voice of a new and improved Spain, 
consequently attempted to assuage civilian fears, repeatedly urging readers to recognize 
that once the war ended, a lasting peace would be restored: “What we are seeing in Spain 
is simply the birth of a nation. Aside from the strength of democratic Spain, the noble Spain 
who defends herself, we understand that we Spaniards do not fight just for Spain: we 
dedicate our fight to the free peoples of the entire world, to democracy and to liberty.”131 
In this way, La Vanguardia positioned the Republic as a largely peaceful force against the 
tyranny of fascism and Spain’s imperialist past at the hands of an abusive and decadent 
monarchy. It criticized the past exploitation of resources in the Americas and the 
Philippines and encouraged the development of an egalitarian Cuba. Republican Spain, it 
argued, occupied a unique place in European history and therefore had to succeed for the 
sake of freedom and democracy around the globe: 
Pursuing the truth of the beautiful Spanish circumstance. Searching for the face of 
this war, in order to make it give up and recognize the immense falsehood of 
fascism. Getting involved in the war, as it is our Spanish core that suffers the 
ferocious assault…It [fascism] came cursing reason. It came dark and silent. 
Hungry for death. Thirsty for blood. Proud of its crown of madness. It believed the 
people to be asleep and to kill them while they slept. And so they cried: victory! 
They brought a murder of crows. (They did not foresee Madrid, Guadalajara, 
Pozoblanco, or Teruel.)132  
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 The war, as framed by La Vanguardia, consequently became an unfortunate 
requirement for the survival of Spain’s newfound liberties. In an especially dramatic article 
titled “The Sleep of Reason Creates Monsters,” the periodical proclaimed the superiority 
of the Republic as rational and fair as opposed to the insane delinquency of dictators such 
as Hitler or Mussolini who could only operate by violent force:  
Mussolini, Hitler, their legions that come to Spain, are nothing more than poor men 
at the service of a monster, whether they like it or not. The monster, their war, with 
his machines, has a robust and independent being that fiercely commands them; he 
is omnipotent to them, just like the cruel gods of ancient times: he cannot survive 
without victims…For this reason he must seek out wars and conflicts–Europe, 
Europe–for such is their inevitable fate…It matters not that this fate tries to disguise 
itself–like a shameful ulcer–behind pseudosciences and philosophies, such as 
racism…133 
 
Interestingly, this article’s title came from a classic engraving by one of Spain’s most 
celebrated artists, Francisco José de Goya y Lucientes (generally shortened to Goya), 
which he completed in 1799 (and continued to change over the course of the next decade) 
as a commentary on the brutish ignorance of Spanish institutions and society. 134  La 
Vanguardia’s readers, most of whom identified with the educated classes, would certainly 
have understood the piece as an allusion to the Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the 
dreams of revolution suddenly crushed by a foreign despot.135 
 Additionally, while the terms for Spain [España], Spanish [español/a], and Spaniard 
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[español/es] abound, those referring to Catalan, Catalonia, and Catalonians are limited 
primarily to linguistic and regional associations. Rather than portray Spanish and Catalan, 
Spain and Catalonia, as opponents of one another, La Vanguardia reframed the region’s 
controversial dual identity as harmoniously coexistent, representing a critical break with 
traditional perceptions of Catalan nationalism. The definition of Spain seemed to expand 
beyond the centralized notion of “Castilian” to include Basque, Andalusian, Galician, 
Asturian, and Catalan, transforming a historically controversial title into a kind of maternal 
symbol. Spain thus assumed the status of a threatened homeland begging the protection of 
all her children. Every edition dedicated columns to topics such as “the future of Spain,” 
the “present situation in Spain,” “the dilemma of Spain,” “the friends of Spain,” 
subsequently fostering a more inclusive and diverse national identity in which Madrid and 
Barcelona fought together as sister cities and not as distant, unrelated allies: 
From this magnificent Madrid–which, twice in just over a century, has assumed 
leadership over the Hispanic peoples and transformed itself into a symbol of the 
fight for our independence against a foreign invasion…from this inimitable city, at 
once delicate and impenetrable, crucible where all the characteristics of the peoples 
and regions of our land are melded into one–I address the Spanish nation so as to 
lay before them, soldiers at the front and the workers at the rear guard, our 
confidence in triumph…and to explain, before all Spaniards, that the ends justify 
the means of our perseverance in the bloody fight toward victory which, though 
distant, is assured.136 
 
This article from June 1938 quotes Juan Negrín, the finance minister of the Second Spanish 
Republic, as he addresses the “Spanish Nation.” Juan Negrín was a respected doctor and 
politician who hailed from a conservative middle-class family in the Canary Islands. He 
ascended the ranks to become the leader of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido 
                                                 




Socialista Obero Español), more popularly known as PSOE, and ultimately assumed the 
position of Finance Minister following the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. He 
became Prime Minister of the Second Spanish Republic in May 1937, under the direction 
of President Manuel Azaña, an office he took with him into exile and held until his death 
in 1956.137 His terminology here is key, as the term “nación española” was (and still is) 
only used by those in favor of collective integration. La Vanguardia similarly promoted 
the notion of Spain as a contrastive homeland, praised Negrín and his associates, and 
lobbied for a strong and cooperative state. Catalonia and Catalan identity are subsequently 
portrayed as comprising a core part of greater Spain and not as divided entities.  
 La Vanguardia thus attempted to consolidate Catalan and Spanish nationalism into 
a single, powerful force pitted against a foreign enemy commandeered by Italy and 
Germany. It should be noted, however, that not all Barcelona-based periodicals shared this 
view or interpretation of events. It appears that La Vanguardia, being a mainstream 
newspaper that proclaimed loyalty to the Republican state, expressed communist and soviet 
sympathies. This likely made it eager to downplay those nationalist sentiments pulsing 
throughout the region, instead hoping to encourage a unified society whose only opponent 
was class difference. As one American socialist observed: “This spirit of nationalism has 
no place in a workers’ world, of course.”138 For this reason, some scholars have classified 
La Vanguardia as a conservative publication, as Barcelona was such a radical place in the 
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1930s that even soviet communism fell to the right of the influential anarchist philosophies 
which challenged Republican politics.139 
 While La Vanguardia actively framed Spanish nationalism as a unifying force 
against Franco and the rise of fascism in accordance with communist ideals, however, it 
promoted democracy above all other forms of government. The newspaper likely 
downplayed local nationalist movements with the hope of both celebrating and 
encouraging cooperation between the Republic’s two most important cities: Barcelona and 
Madrid. Moreover, La Vanguardia still sought to recruit foreign aid from Britain and the 
United States, democratic powers it regularly praised. It would have been in Spain’s best 
interest, therefore, to communicate the war as a “battle of ideologies” between Spain and 
the Axis Powers, fascism and democracy, justice and injustice, without revealing the truth 
behind the devastating fragmentation of the Republican base.  
 The month of July proved an especially fiery month as this frame, which 
characterized the conflict in terms of a foreign invader threatening a unified democratic 
Spain, became dominant in La Vanguardia’s coverage. On July 12, the front page divided 
its headlines between “the war against the foreign invasion” and “the raids of the Italo-
German air force.”140 On July 17, La Vanguardia argued against the Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia (then known as Abyssinia), writing “Fight, Abyssinia. Spain defends herself 
heroically. China awakes from a thousand-year dream. Totalitarianism shall not succeed in 
dominating us. But the western democracies, oh!, they have not yet realized that we–the 
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Abyssinians, the Spaniards, and the Chinese–are fighting for them!”141 Though China and 
Ethiopia were not fighting in the name of democracy, per say, they were fighting against 
the expansionist policies of Japan and Italy, respectively, both of whom were members of 
the Axis powers formed in 1936. As La Vanguardia perceived the Spanish Civil War to 
extend beyond national borders into the international realm, it portrayed all three countries–
Spain, China, and Abyssinia–as simultaneously resisting the imperialist aggressions of the 
fascist alliance. 
 On Christmas Day, 1938, La Vanguardia printed the speech delivered by Negrín in 
which he pleaded for Republican perseverance and for the lives of those soldiers captured 
by Franco. “Nothing overcomes Spaniards in the fight for their country!,” the headline 
boasted.142 By the end of January 1939 the express union between Madrid and Barcelona 
had become so strong that La Vanguardia boldly printed “the love for our land melds us 
into one destiny and one soul: Catalonia!…The enemy we face is neither Spanish nor 
Catalan…the defense of the Spanish Republic unites us.”143 Not only did these words serve 
to establish Catalan identity as an integral part of the Spanish national makeup, but they 
also reinforced the concept of the enemy as an insidious invader threatening the nation 
from the outside. This feeds into the second theme of analysis in the international conflict 
frame discussed in the next section, as it drew a clear line between the “battered Spanish 
people” and their foreign oppressors. Furthermore, it elevated Barcelona to a symbolic 
place in global affairs as key to the future of world democracy. 
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Theme Two: Barcelona’s Place on the World Stage 
 As previously mentioned, at the time of the Spanish Civil War, Spain was a poor 
and undeveloped country that the rest of Europe considered backward, irrelevant, and even 
“oriental.”144 After losing the last of its colonies in 1898 in the Spanish-American War, 
Spain officially lost its status as a world power. This gave Spain the likeness of a small and 
insignificant country undeserving of world attention.145 As Payne has observed: “Spain is 
the only western European country for whom ‘decline’ became an obsessive theme, first 
for foreign writers and then for Spanish historians and commentators.”146 And if Spain 
meant so little on a global scale, then the heart of Catalonia meant even less. 
 As a result, Barcelona found itself in a difficult position when war broke out. It had 
to convince Europe to take action in an impoverished foreign nation. It had to convince its 
own citizens that the efforts within the city walls equaled those beyond them. Above all, it 
had to convince the world that the fate of Spain mattered. La Vanguardia evidently 
understood this need, as it consistently published articles that warned of the insidious 
fascist threat creeping around the globe and elevated the Spanish struggle for democracy 
to the ultimate symbol of human freedom. For example, in October of 1938, La Vanguardia 
wrote: “A Wishful Soul Flies Over a Dying Liberty.” “Hitler has entered Czechoslovakia,” 
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it declared, “to take possession of all that suits him. Now there is talk of doing away with 
the Munich Agreement. What is the point of slowing down the inevitable with vain 
formalities?…Here lived a nation [Great Britain] and it killed itself.”147 In referencing the 
Nazi invasion of the Sudetenland, La Vanguardia criticized Western countries for ignoring 
Hitler’s advances and for being so slow to react to his abuses. The newspaper contended 
that fascism was not an isolated threat, but a growing sickness spreading across the 
continent and mistakenly unchecked by powerful rivals. It compared Spain’s position to 
that of Czechoslovakia: a nation unjustly robbed of its sovereignty. Moreover, it suggested 
that the campaign for fascism had only just begun and would continue to attack until 
forcefully challenged. In another article from the same day, it continued to emphasize this 
line of thought: 
The problem is substantial. How can he [Chamberlain] be so disinterested in Spain, 
a Mediterranean nation and major peninsula in the Atlantic? How can he be so 
absent-minded toward a country of 24 million people, a country that borders Africa 
and whose coasts and islands control the fundamental maritime routes and passages 
of Europe to the point that they wrestle over colonies, protectorates, and mandates 
without even considering our vote?148 
 
La Vanguardia argued two major points in this publication: (1) Spain’s independence was 
being wrongfully threatened by a common enemy (fascism), and (2) Spain retained a 
strategic position in Europe with the potential to affect international trade and commerce 
if taken by Franco. Though strong throughout the war, this viewpoint developed into an 
especially notable theme toward the end of 1938. This frame likely operated with the end 
goal of encouraging public determination in the war effort by highlighting what 
                                                 






distinguished it from other, less noble conflicts.  
 In addition to insisting that the war in Spain was relevant to the entire “free world,” 
reaffirming Spain’s lingering connections to strategic ports and maritime passages, and 
protesting the label of “civil war,” it also proclaimed the message of “revolution.” It 
highlighted the values and fundamental human rights that the Second Spanish Republic so 
ardently defended. The massive scale of revolutionary influence in the city of Barcelona 
cannot be overstated. In just a few years, the Second Spanish Republic had implemented a 
number of reforms that broke down many of the traditional power structures that had 
oppressed Spanish citizens for centuries. Contemporaries claimed that to be in Barcelona 
felt akin to “living the revolution firsthand.” Foreigners flocked to Catalonia to participate 
in a vibrant collective movement enveloped by “radical” liberalist ideas such as fair wages, 
gender equality, secular education, and social equality. According to one description: 
“What a city! It was just like a volcano, erupting in all directions at the same time. A 
breathtaking, awe-inspiring and heartwarming spectacle of noise, bustle, enthusiasm and 
gaiety. A revolutionary city in the full flood of revolutionary zest and zeal; an unforgettable 
sight.” 149  This statement was hardly unique, as thousands of travelers made similar 
observations. Perhaps the most famous account remains Orwell’s Homage to Catalonia, in 
which he described countless scenes of revolutionary fervor and political enthusiasm on 
behalf of Spaniards, Italians, Germans, Brits, and Americans alike. The atmosphere was 
evidently intoxicating to those who experienced it. La Vanguardia, at the heart of this 
discourse, would have certainly understood this incredible appeal and uniqueness better 
than anyone. 
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 La Vanguardia clearly recognized the importance of communicating Barcelona's 
greater role and significance in the “war of the century.” It firmly established Spain’s 
position as embodying a sincerely democratic spirit akin to American and British ideals, 
and portrayed Catalonia as the “last stand” against the totalitarian policies of Franco, Hitler, 
and Mussolini. The daily framing of these characteristics throughout the war thus promoted 
Spain’s position in the global community of the 1930s, in addition to depicting Republican 
Spain as a real and solid ally to western nations at odds with the new ruling order sweeping 
across Europe. After all, Portugal had already fallen to fascist Prime Minister António de 
Oliveira Salazar in 1932 and Franco had stepped up his offensives on Madrid and 
Barcelona, the two cities vital to Republican survival, over the course of 1938.150 By this 
point, Republican officials knew that the only hope of preserving Spanish democracy lay 
in foreign powers that still refused to mobilize.   
 Perhaps the most striking feature of this frame is the way the periodical seemed to 
reach out to a wider readership outside of Spain. Barcelona’s location so close to the French 
border was a constant source of news, soldiers, and resources. Though formidable to cross, 
travel over the Pyrenees was common, as it was one of the only viable ways to enter or 
leave the country.151 On multiple occasions, bold front-page articles appeared to speak 
directly to foreign audiences, even advising them on particular courses of action. 
 In an article from July 17, the headline read “Everything Has a Price”: 
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England rewards the repentant. But, what about the others who are free of guilt, the 
irreproachable, the virtuous? If it so happens that, in order to obtain the economic 
support of Great Britain, one must resort to blackmail, instigate a revolt, resurrect 
the practice of piracy, threaten war or not honor those international commitments 
voluntarily contracted, then all nations with failing budgets are going to feel 
themselves propelled to chaos. If a man of such clear intelligence in business as Mr. 
Chamberlain has not foreseen this, then he has not thought to look around him at 
the great lengths leaders will go to avoid delivering on their promises. A perfectly 
reasonable assumption nowadays.152 
 
The article went on to warn Britain not to trust Salazar, reminding Chamberlain of the 
parallels between a potential deal with Fascist Portugal and the already failed deals with 
Fascist Germany and Fascist Italy. It argued that Salazar had more to gain from an alliance 
with Hitler and Mussolini than with Chamberlain, making Portugal unreliable:  
First, he wanted to buy Hitler, promising Lord Halifax a new “arrangement” of the 
economic regulations; he has thought about buying Franco a hundred times over if 
he should win the war; he offered everything and more to Mussolini for signing the 
“gentleman’s agreement”; now he dangles a tantalizing loan before Oliveira’s 
[Salazar’s] eyes. But for some reason or other, the truth is that he won’t get a single 
shilling.153 
 
 The phrase used, translated in this context as “everything and more,” is actually “el 
oro y el moro,” a Spanish idiom referring to a historical event in which a Moorish Alcalde 
[governor] and his nephew were captured by Castilian bandits in the fifteenth century. 
According to the story, they demanded an exorbitant sum for their ransom which was 
promptly paid by the kingdom of Ronda. Upon receipt of the gold, however, the bandits 
released only the governor and insisted on keeping his nephew until another similar sum 
was received. Juan II of Castile eventually found himself forced to intervene, ordering the 
bandits to release the prisoner. Nonetheless, the incident spawned in Andalusia the popular 
                                                 





phrase: “quería quedarse con el oro y el moro” [he wanted to keep both the gold and the 
moor].154 The use of this idiom, however common, was striking as it related so well to the 
context it described. It adeptly criticized the extortion of a foreign leader by a dishonest 
government.155 Language carries within it the traces of a cultural heritage that helps to 
shape the collective identity of a group, and educated Spaniards would have instinctively 
picked up on the reference. As Edward T. Hall insists, “culture is communication” and 
“meanings must be found in the context of hundreds of years of history.” Indeed, this 
passage certainly illustrates his case that “the language of politics and the language of 
culture are a long way apart, yet each subsumes the other.”156  
 La Vanguardia’s editor and writers would have known the likelihood of the paper’s 
dissemination in France and Britain, especially via the tens of thousands of foreigners 
passing through Barcelona, the vast majority of whom maintained a steady correspondence 
with friends and relatives abroad. Being the most prominent newspaper in the region, and 
furthermore, among the only mainstream sources to print almost exclusively in Spanish 
(instead of Catalan), La Vanguardia held the attention of readers in multiple cities, 
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including Madrid, Paris, London, and New York. Consequently, this subject merits further 
research into the circumstances surrounding La Vanguardia’s wartime publications, its 
geographic distribution, and the life of its especially elusive editor, María Luz Morales 
Godoy, the first woman ever to head a Spanish newspaper.157 In the meantime, I must ask 
the following questions: did La Vanguardia seek first and foremost to convince locals of a 
false hope or did it intend to convert foreign readers to its cause? The answer, I believe, is 
both. 
 In an article from August 5 titled “Diplomacy and Resistance,” La Vanguardia 
again criticized Britain and the United States for their lack of involvement, describing the 
Spanish Civil War as “this historic crisis of civilization.” Moreover, it explicitly argued 
that Spain presently “suffers under the pressures of international diplomacy” and the 
deceptive “maneuvers” of foreign nations:   
If the governments of the democratic powers had committed themselves to 
nonintervention, not so much as a policy but as a mechanism to prevent dangerous 
internal ideologies from gaining footholds, thereby evading their responsibilities and 
deferring to evasive compromises, the influence of the Spanish war would have tilted 
Europe decisively in favor of the Republic and defending freedom, law and peace. 
But in spite of such misplaced prudences and false alarms that have weakened our 
position, the Spanish a Republic is doing everything necessary to manifest its 
character and to leave its fingerprint on each day so that the Foreign Office, the Quay 
d’Orsay, the Palace of Venice, and the Willemstrasse can never untie themselves 
from us.158 
 
Criticism of the noninterventionist policies of France, Great Britain, and the United States 
became increasingly severe throughout the year of 1938. La Vanguardia portrayed the 
policy as being a thinly-veiled cover-up of their refusal to honor alliances. This denial of 
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the facts, it argued, could only be attributed to cowardice or delusion. It considered this 
negligence an insult to the democratic principles those countries claimed to uphold.  
 Throughout the month of August, the pleas for foreign intervention continued to 
intensify. The Battle of Ebro had begun in July, a battle launched, in part, to regain lost 
Republican territory in order to negotiate anew with France and Britain from a stronger, 
more powerful position.159 On August 13, La Vanguardia printed the headline “Spain in 
the Close-Up,” in which it reported that French and British politicians had finally come to 
realize that “the neurological point of European tension was the war in Spain.” It ominously 
claimed that Hitler and Mussolini planned to further their “imperialist interests” and to 
destabilize the whole of Europe. La Vanguardia described the conflict as part of “an 
aggressive process” in which the world’s democracies must not shirk their proper duty to 
defend the legitimate Republican government. It stated that “Spain is an essential piece” in 
the battle for world domination, and so “the dictators will not relent because they 
cannot.”160 Just a week later on August 21, La Vanguardia printed more to this effect in 
“Spain emerges as a symbol,” appealing yet again to British and American interests: 
The democratic opinion of Europe has been moved once more by the voices of 
courage that come from the United States of America…The reason for this 
excitement is the insistence of the American president and his secretary of state in 
declaring that nations are united by an intricate network of economic interests and 
cultural relations which render the policy of isolation impossible. Therefore, 
international cooperation is required: both in peace for common prosperity and in 
war to defend freedom and the right of each of us to hold our own against the forces 
of chaos as embodied by assailant and undemocratic militarism.161 
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The violent militarist tendencies of Germany, Italy, and Japan came to dominate the papers. 
By September, the Falangists and their sympathizers were no longer referred to as 
Spaniards, but as “traitors,” “invaders,” and foreign mercenaries. This discourse classified 
Hitler as the supreme commander of totalitarianism with Mussolini as his hapless 
subordinate and Franco his dutiful servant. On several occasions, it called the three men 
“slaves” to the brutal ambitions driving them.  
 Throughout the fall of 1938 La Vanguardia continued to push Western democracies 
to action, criticizing their lack of resolve in the face of the obvious and immediate threat 
posed by the rise of fascism. In these months, it argued that Geneva must “confront two 
irreconcilable principles: that of law and that of violence.” It repeatedly compared Spain’s 
position to that of China, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Abyssinia–countries bullied by 
Fascist forces while democratic governments neglected their obligations. On multiple 
occasions, La Vanguardia suggested that this lack of action could only be interpreted as 
granting permission to the offending parties. It stated that Spaniards “need more effective 
assistance than rhetoric.” Moreover, it warned that if Europe remained in a perpetual state 
of “contemplative diplomacy,” then Hitler would “go on devouring nations for the supreme 
glory of the great German Reich,” eventually resulting in “the annihilation of civilization, 
that circle of culture, that which we call Europe.”162  
 La Vanguardia tactfully sympathized with the rest of the continent in acknowledging 
that Spain did not suffer alone. “Europe witnesses dark times,” it wrote, “the forces of 
peace labor away in secret diplomatic meetings and ministerial assemblies. No one desires 
                                                 




war, and they are right not to desire it.” At the same time, however, it reaffirmed that 
“France must be ready to honor her treaties and, above all, take up arms to stop the 
adversary that oppresses her,” and that England cannot “wash her hands of her ally.” It 
solemnly recalled the beginnings of World War I in 1914 and the “colossal” threat of 
“pangermanismo” [German nationalism], implying that another world war was 
inevitable.163 
 October saw the publication of a particularly somber issue–Spain’s official farewell 
to the soldiers of the International Brigades. On two occasions, La Vanguardia dedicated 
moving elegies to the foreigners that had given up so much to fight alongside them. Many 
members of the International Brigades found themselves unable to return to their countries 
of origin due to government decrees that blacklisted them as undesirables, rabble-rousers, 
and communists. The United States, for example, which declared the act of lending any 
sort of military aid to Spain illegal, threatened to arrest them should they attempt to re-
enter the country. Scores of German, Italian, and French volunteers would ultimately perish 
in concentration camps for their political dissidence. Generally speaking, not only did these 
recruits receive no thanks for their efforts abroad, but many of them also suffered harsh 
repercussions for their efforts. Additionally, at the time hundreds of international 
volunteers still languished in Spanish prisons for a variety of unsubstantiated charges, 
where they were denied due process until the end of the war, at which point they fell 
directly into the hands of fascist troops.164 
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 On October 5, the newspaper announced the pending formal dismissal of the 
International Brigades to take place later that month. “Only we Spaniards shall remain,” it 
declared, “the International Brigades are leaving.”165 On the official day of their departure, 
October 28, the headline read: “I tell you on behalf of the Spanish people that we do not 
promise, as is custom, to fight to the death. We promise to succeed: WE PROMISE TO 
WIN! Take home to your countries THAT WHICH YOU HAVE LEARNED HERE, that 
is, the MEANING OF UNITY.”166 These words were taken from the speeches delivered 
by Republican leaders at a grand procession down the Diagonal in Barcelona. It is 
estimated that as many as 300,000 people lined the streets in attendance to honor their 
sacrifice.167 It was on this occasion that La Pasionaria, the woman who coined the now-
celebrated cry of “¡no pasarán!” [they shall not pass!], famously proclaimed: 
Comrades of the International Brigades! Political reasons, reasons of state, the 
welfare of that cause for which you offered your blood with boundless generosity, 
are sending you back, some of you to your own countries and others to forced exile. 
You can go proudly. You are history. You are legend. You are the heroic example of 
democracy’s solidarity and universality. We shall not forget you and, when the olive 
tree of peace puts forth its leaves again, mingled with the laurels of the Spanish 
Republic’s victory, come back!168  
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Interestingly, this withdrawal occurred as they continued to wage the Battle of the Ebro, in 
which thousands of international recruits still served. The exact figure of Brigaders present 
in Barcelona at that time remains unknown, but the fact is they left behind at least 9,934 
dead and 7,686 missing comrades.169     
 Despite this farewell, the calls for international intervention continued to intensify so 
that the new year saw the distribution of articles all but begging for democratic support. 
The edition printed January 1, 1939, featured a bold front page dedicated entirely to the 
explicit realization of the Spanish Civil War as International Conflict frame. It referred to 
the speech delivered by Juan Negrín the previous evening. In it, “President Negrín 
addresses the United States: ‘the light can come from the west’” and “harshly criticizes the 
totalitarian maneuvers that threaten nations and human liberty.” At long last, he articulated 
“the true meaning of our superhuman fight.” Moreover, according to the newspaper, he did 
so in English:  
Spain’s affairs are presently the world’s affairs, and what happens in our country is 
of such vital importance to the future that no one, in any part of it, should remain 
indifferent to the outcome. All countries and all peoples will feel the effects of the 
end result of this fight in Spain. Here, we shall determine if the relations between 
countries are to be carried out by brute force or by international law and mutual 
agreement; if we are to be divided up by imperialist dictators or governed by 
democratic governments; if “gangsterism” is to be accepted…or if democracy and 
liberty are to survive…this, above all, is the meaning, the true meaning of our 
superhuman fight in Spain.”170 
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He argued that Spain was the “first bastion against totalitarianism” and that the military 
rebellion led by Franco serviced “extortion and piracy” so that “true Europeans turn their 
eyes toward the great American democracy” for aid. He poignantly warned that the 
“blindness” and denial exhibited by “neutral and ally nations” could ultimately prove 
devastating to human progress and civilization for generations to come.    
 La Vanguardia quoted heavily from the speeches delivered by Juan Negrín and other 
Republican deputies throughout the war in a consistently positive and encouraging light. 
In this way, La Vanguardia attempted to furnish government support and a unified public 
in order to promote the image of a strong and cohesive Spanish force. The age-old rivalries 
between Barcelona and Madrid, Catalan and Castilian, socialist and communist faded away 
in favor of a collective Spanish national identity. The newspaper brushed aside all rumors 
of disharmony and frustration. Instead, La Vanguardia described a brilliant and 
revolutionary Barcelona, a utopian city under siege by foreign invaders. Most importantly, 
it crafted a frame that portrayed the Spanish Civil War not as the result of a military 
insurgency contained by national borders, but as an international conflict of epic 
proportions. 
 This frame reveals how La Vanguardia interpreted the Spanish Civil War for 
contemporary readers, emphasizing an international, as opposed to national, conflict. It 
appealed to Western democracies for aid by highlighting their common values and interests 
and decrying the brutal policies of fascist regimes. The next chapter explores the second 
wartime frame composed by La Vanguardia, that of the Media as Guardian of Democracy 



























Figure 2.1 “El Dulcificado Madrid” [The Sugar-coated Madrid], La Vanguardia, 






CHAPTER 3  
 
THE MEDIA AS GUARDIAN OF DEMOCRACY FRAME  
 
Introduction 
 La Vanguardia contributed to an interesting conception of the “idea of the report,” 
as first discussed by Carey, in clearly defining its “purpose” in a critical moment of world 
history. It not only voiced concern for covering contemporary events in order to keep the 
public informed, but also positioned itself as vital to the protection of Spanish democracy. 
This chapter examines La Vanguardia’s framing of the media as a guardian of democratic 
values in Spain. The frame is constructed via two predominant themes: (1) pleas for 
sustained and spirited resistance and (2) the announcement of exaggerated (sometimes 
fake) military victories to sustain the public’s hope. La Vanguardia thus encouraged citizen 
agency by citing the injustices of vilified opponents and by emphasizing the power of the 
individual, argued for fierce collective resistance in the face of defeat as part of what I have 
termed the “rhetoric of despair,” and criticized the oppressive tendencies of imperialism 
and autocracy. This analysis is divided into three sections. The first details the emergence 
of the frame in 1936-1937, while the following two sections discuss its evolution during 





Emergence and Development 
 On September 10, 1936, La Vanguardia extended its masthead to include the title: 
Diario al servicio de la democracia [Newspaper at the Service of Democracy].171 This 
marked one of the earliest strategies to emphasize the media’s role in the conflict as one of 
a popular voice defending democratic principles, rather than a biased or censured outlet 
manipulated by a totalitarian government. Additionally, it presented the Republic as a 
unified democracy while simultaneously downplaying perceived Marxist and communist 
sympathies.  
 La Vanguardia repeatedly stressed the Catalonian government’s support of the 
armed forces and all citizens fighting for “libertad” [liberty], and provided detailed 
“reports” of the atrocities committed by fascist militias in the occupied territories, that is, 
public executions, conscription, mass graves, and air strikes, as illustrated by headlines like 
“The Fascist Terror in Asturias, Mass Executions in Covadonga.”172 In March 1937, it 
printed the piece “Galicia, the martyr”:  
The string of brutal assassinations continues here in Galicia. They do not seem to 
weary of bloodshed. In my little Sada already 27 down; in La Coruña 1,600 and in 
Ferrol some 6,000…On December 20, they executed close to 500…Our martyred 
land, now bereft of Republicans of every shade…Galicia has no liberals left, aside 
from those that emigrated to America and the loyalist zone. To them we must look 
for the future of our homeland…173  
 
The article quoted Ramón Suárez Picallo, a Spanish Republican politician and leader of 
the Partido Galeguista [Galicianist Party] elected as the federal member of A Coruña in 
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1936. Following the invasion of Galicia in July that same year, he was forced to flee to 
Barcelona and then to Buenos Aires, where he remained an ardent defender of Galician 
autonomy and culture until his death in 1964.174 
 Galicia, the northwestern-most state of Spain bordering Portugal and the Spanish 
regions of Asturias and Castilla y León, was among the first territories conquered by 
Franco, likely because the general had a home-ground advantage. Franco, though 
descended from a distinguished Andalusian military family, had grown up in the city of 
Ferrol in the industrial province of A Coruña and attended the famous naval academy 
there.175 Furthermore, Galicia’s Portuguese neighbors had already succumbed to fascism 
when Antonio de Oliveira Salazar solidified his power as totalitarian head of state in 1932. 
Salazar had closed the borders in support of Franco, severely crippling the mobilization of 
the Galician liberal resistance.176 Additionally, it appears that the Falangists had managed 
covertly to activate a military uprising in various cells throughout the region. As reported 
in Suárez Picallo’s letter, Republican allies and sympathizers subsequently found 
themselves eliminated at an alarming rate, leaving the region securely under fascist control 
within a few weeks. Divisional commanders, civil servants, and local mayors were 
promptly arrested and executed, their families imprisoned. Juana Capdevielle, the 
accomplished intellectual wife of A Coruña’s civil governor Francisco Pérez Carballo was 
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even detained, raped, and murdered as a terrifying message to Republican loyalists.177 
Galicia, similarly to Catalonia, had cultivated a language and culture distinct from central 
Spain since ancient times, and the swift and brutal oppression of such “differences” likely 
served as a disquieting reminder to Catalonians everywhere that their Catalan culture, 
language and society would be similarly persecuted by Franco, especially should 
Barcelona, their proud and prosperous capital, ultimately fail.  
 On May 26, 1937, La Vanguardia printed an edition devoted almost entirely to the 
bombing of Guernica and “La Ciudad Universitaria.”178 Comprised of only four pages and 
featuring no articles, it let the gruesome photos tell the story of Franco’s brutality, making 
it a unique issue. The caption at the center read:  
Here lie the remains of Guernica, the city symbolizing Basque liberties, destroyed 
by the incendiary bombs of assorted squadrons of German planes. Barbaric show 
of an undeniable intervention, and of an attitude they call “defender of civilization.” 
In Guernica, this capital [...] of Euzkadi, only five houses have been left standing, 
but as an immortal and eternal symbol.179  
 
By incorporating the name “Euzkadi,” the Basque-language term for the Basque Country, 
La Vanguardia expressed a powerful and strategic solidarity with Republican allies in 
Northern Spain. A historic Basque capital, the destruction of Guernica, which left an 
estimated 300+ civilians dead, dealt a devastating blow to the region, terrifying their 
Catalan neighbors. Home to an ancient oak, under which the Basque fueros, or code of 
laws, were proclaimed according to a supposedly democratic tradition stretching back into 
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legend, Guernica had long been upheld as an international symbol of Republican values 
and regional autonomy. 180  By the twentieth century it was considered a minor and 
defenseless settlement, but its utter destruction shocked the Western world, a fact 
immortalized by Picasso’s classic painting.181  
 Perhaps with this unusual, strikingly visual elegy, La Vanguardia hoped to 
mobilize readers and prepare Barcelona for the inevitable and fast-approaching “Batalla de 
Cataluña” [Battle of Catalonia]. As Valocchi argues, “the key to framing is finding 
evocative cultural symbols that resonate with potential constituents and are capable of 
motivating them to collective actions,” and indeed, it is difficult to find a village of greater 
cultural significance than Guernica.182 Moreover, by “reducing the war to a photograph,” 
this issue helped to strengthen La Vanguardia’s existing collective action frames. 
According to Zelizer: “journalism’s images of war provide a strategically narrowed way of 
visualizing the battlefield...Journalism’s images force the public to see war but in a way 
that only partly reflects the war being depicted.”183 La Vanguardia also worked to sustain 
the Republic via generous monetary contributions, which it publicly announced on its front 
pages. Such declarations served to show dedication to the cause and to maintain public 
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opinion of the paper as a democratic voice, in addition to providing much-needed funds: 
“Since August 31, the personnel of the editorial, administrative, studio, and distribution 
offices of La Vanguardia (worker cooperative) have donated from their own salaries to the 
anti-fascist militias the amount of 30,149 pesetas.” 184 Strategically published on New 
Year’s Day in 1937, it fortified La Vanguardia’s position as a Republican periodical 
directly involved in the survival of Spanish democracy, and encouraged public confidence 
in the war effort for the coming year.  
 In the opening weeks of the war, La Vanguardia did not present it as a war at all. 
Rather, it described “isolated factions” attacking random cities and dismissed rumors of 
their advancement, assuring readers that the Republic was already in the process of 
regaining recent losses. Writers encouraged citizens to return to their normal routines and 
to uphold Barcelona as a strong and functional metropolis of the Republic. Though by 
October of that same year it had changed its tune, by then describing it as the “war of the 
century,” it continued to emphasize the role of the working citizen as an active agent who 
could secure the future of a nation. Furthermore, not only did this frame persist as the war 
progressed, but it even escalated to the point of citizens being explicitly declared the only 
determinant agents in battle, the Republican government and media being reduced to 
nothing without them, as evidenced by the January 25, 1936, front-page article cited at the 
beginning of this thesis.  
 Scholars have suggested that media portrayals valuing the average voter as critical 
and beneficial to the democratic process encourage political involvement within 
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communities, thus fostering greater electoral participation.185 Perhaps this concept could 
also be extended, in some respects, to La Vanguardia’s wartime strategies. While no 
elections were held between 1936 and 1939, the Republic clearly worked hard to maintain 
its reputation as a veritable democracy fighting for the rights of the Spanish people, 
specifically the working classes which had made its existence possible in the first place.186  
 Unlike contemporary American news media sources that have reflected a tendency 
in recent years to downplay the role of individual voters and, in some cases, even portrayed 
their actions as “harmful,” La Vanguardia promoted the function of Barcelona’s citizenry, 
proclaiming them instrumental to the resistance and promoting their civic engagement in 
every facet of the war effort. 187 The paper published routine announcements detailing 
where and when to mail packages to loved ones on the front and what to send them, places 
to meet and mobilize, and what hospitals to visit should residents become ill or injured.  
 In this way, the periodical presented each and every citizen as someone capable of 
making a difference in the outcome of the conflict, crediting Barceloneses as the driving 
force behind Republican triumphs and resilience to adversity. Even Barcelona’s children 
were considered valuable to the cause and critical to the future of the Republic. La 
Vanguardia encouraged donations in the form of games, toys, food, and clothing, and 
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dedicated weeks to “the child,” in which parents were told to instill in their children genuine 
revolutionary spirit and enthusiasm for the “heroic battle” against fascism and inequality:  
Remember the children!…One must explain to the children, at home and at school, 
the significance of our civil war… and above all, awaken and brighten their faith in 
the future, with an organization of society that is more equal, more just, and more 
humane, in which the health and happiness of all will be valued.188 
 
Such articles reiterated the Republican commitment to the construction of a new and 
egalitarian Spain that would offer better prospects to future generations. After all, the 
promises that drove the Second Spanish Republic since its inception included universal 
education, equal opportunity, the elimination of rigid class differences, and other matters 
which progressives held to be fundamental human rights. 
 According to La Vanguardia’s historic example, then, the media may possibly be 
used as a tool by which to cultivate a space in which individuals can interact, come together 
as a community, and effectively battle injustice: “As Hart, Jarvis, and colleagues have 
shown, it is often the case that political keywords are at the crossroads of change and 
stability where certain elite voices promote them and other elite voices challenge them.”189 
In other words, this master frame may be classified as “motivational” in nature, as it 
“attempts to give people a reason to join collective action.” Studies have demonstrated that 
identification of the “problem” is not usually enough to move individuals to action.190 In 
other words, such frames serve to “trigger” collective movements and persuade targeted 
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 This master frame effectively encompassed the three major components central to 
the construction of collective action frames: identity, agency, and injustice. It clearly 
specified a persecuted group (Spanish Democracy), and drew a clear line between the “we” 
(Spain’s “loyal” citizens) and the “them” (Franco and his supporters).191 This frame was 
constructed of two predominant themes: pleas for sustained and spirited resistance and the 
announcement of exaggerated (sometimes fake) military victories to sustain the public’s 
hope. In so doing, La Vanguardia encouraged citizen agency by citing the injustices of 
vilified opponents and by emphasizing the power of the individual, argued for fierce 
collective resistance in the face of defeat as part of what I have termed the “rhetoric of 
despair,” and criticized the oppressive tendencies of imperialism and autocracy. 
 
Theme One: Pleas for Resistance 
 June of 1938 witnessed yet another deadly blow to liberal Barcelona and the 
Republic when France again closed its borders to Spain and refused to deal arms to the 
Popular Army. In February they had officially lost the Battle of Teruel followed by the 
defeat of Vinaroz (Vinaròs in Catalán), a seaside town in Valencia, effectively splitting the 
Republican zone in two. To make matters worse, Republicans continued to lose key 
territories in the Basque country up north, giving Franco the opportunity to launch his 
attacks on Catalonia from multiple directions. 192  Yet La Vanguardia downplayed the 
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alarming setbacks, rarely mentioning them by name, and instead used the front pages to 
advocate for “tenacity,” “hope,” and “optimism.” On June 19, it featured the following 
headline in the form of a quote from Negrín: 
So long as we still have a corner of our land left, so long as a single Spanish heart 
still beats, so long as the future of our country hangs in the balance, we may give 
in or we may vanquish. And we shall vanquish…Victory depends upon our tenacity 
and it is worth every sacrifice. Resistance was, and still is, the open way to 
victory.193  
 
The paper went on to condemn potential faithlessness on behalf of the Spanish public as 
the “greatest evil,” reciting still more portions of Negrín’s excessively hopeful speech:  
The lack of confidence in our people, the lack of faith in triumph, the lack of 
enthusiasm for the greatness of our cause, drags us to the verge of 
catastrophe…Neither in life nor in war can one triumph without faith. Faith creates 
and overcomes. Success cannot be possible if one contemplates defeat and prepares 
to surrender before the fight.194  
 
In this way, La Vanguardia performed a kind of rhetoric of despair, in which its writers 
refused to concede the reality of their situation. Instead, they masqueraded their 
despondency as enthusiasm with exuberant language and extreme optimism. Headlines did 
not describe military losses but military “victories,” many of which, at this point, were 
either fictional or exaggerated. For example, La Vanguardia never admitted defeat in the 
Basque country even when signaling mass evacuations of the region. Instead, it focused on 
the many generous efforts made by the city’s citizens to welcome refugees and look after 
displaced or orphaned children. To this effect, it posted bilingual ads in Spanish and 
Catalan informing the public to look after their “brothers and sisters” and praising their 
heroic fight against the “Fascist invaders.” It also began to place greater emphasis on the 
                                                 





role of children in Catalonia. It encouraged Barcelona’s youths to “join the cause,” called 
upon parents to educate their families on the importance of the revolution, and discussed 
the war in terms of a justified fight for a better future for all Spaniards regardless of class 
or ethnicity.  
 Such appeals likely served as an attempt to re-energize its base, as Spain’s 1930 
revolution was built upon the radical promises of the redistribution of land and wealth, the 
eradication of an abusive Church and its institutions, the creation of an egalitarian 
democracy in which men and women could vote, and universal education. Additionally, 
the Second Spanish Republic celebrated the elevation of traditionally marginalized regions, 
their unique cultures and languages.195 La Vanguardia repeatedly listed the “reasons for 
the war,” as if to reemphasize their central importance, and explicitly proclaimed the 
importance of sustained courage and resistance in the face of fascism. As a prized example 
of such fortitude, multiple articles emerged celebrating Menorca, a Catalan-speaking island 
off the eastern coast of Spain. On June 30, it went so far as to publish a sensational biopic 
titled “Menorca, the indomitable” in which it heralded the island’s success in holding off 
Italian forces for over two years despite relentless air raids. It even described Menorca as 
“the island of death” in regard to the encroach of fascism: “Menorca, the garden of the 
Mediterranean, has been one of the many surprises of this war without precedent in world 
history…to the only island free from the tyranny of the lictors’ beam.”196 
 La Vanguardia consistently referred to Mussolini as a kind of escort to Hitler, 
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framing him as a subservient bodyguard to Germany and the Nationalists. In using the term 
“lictor,” La Vanguardia recalled the practice in Ancient Rome of dictators and powerful 
nobles being accompanied by select plebes in order to avoid bodily harm.197 Menorca had, 
in fact, put up an impressive defense, making Franco rethink his attacks on a seemingly 
vulnerable island he had planned to conquer in a matter of days. Its successful resistance, 
however, was largely made possible by its unfettered ties to Catalonia and Valencia and 
the access to arms and supplies they provided. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Menorca 
ultimately surrendered less than a month after the fall of Barcelona in early 1939.198  
 As Catalonians began to lose sight of the victory that the Republic continued to 
proclaim “imminent,” La Vanguardia published increasingly passionate articles decrying 
the fatal crime it named a “lack of faith.”199 It began to assert that Republican values would 
certainly triumph even if the fight looked long and brutal. In one such piece titled “The 
Power of Heroism and Resistance,” it concluded that “a lesson learned in the Spanish 
Resistance is that energy produces efficiency.”200 On another occasion it argued that a “war 
is not won or lost until the final battle.” 201  Most of these articles accompanied 
proclamations of Republican advances, the swift “punishment” of enemy combatants, and 
the valuable information obtained from various “desperate” and “disillusioned” prisoners 
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of war (and occasionally, defectors). Moreover, it continued to give the impression that 
world powers regularly convened to revise the nonintervention policies they had stipulated 
at the outset of the conflict. It even blamed the standing Republican Government of 1936 
for its “negligence,” accusing its officials of failing to advocate better for the “cause” 
abroad in order to recruit international aid. 202 This type of coverage was deliberately 
misleading, as no such meetings were taking place, or at least, not with the level of intensity 
or influence presumed. 
 On March 15, 1938, the headline contained the famous Catalan phrase: “Ara és 
l’hora, catalans!”203 Literally translated to mean “now is the time, Catalonians,” the phrase 
has long-standing associations with the region’s nationalist movement. Its exact origins 
remain uncertain, but it is the official chant for the National Day of Catalonia celebrated 
annually on September 11 to honor those fallen heroes who defended Barcelona against 
Philip V in the War of Spanish Succession (1702-1715). The siege, which began in 1713 
and lasted fourteen months, resulted in the loss of Catalan liberties, institutions, and laws. 
Today, it is remembered as a symbol of the Catalan struggle for independence.204 In this 
case, however, the phrase called for Catalonian resistance against Spain’s fascist invaders.  
 It began by acknowledging that “the war that was far away, so far away from 
Catalonia” finally crept up on them by way of Aragon (a Catalan-speaking state sharing 
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Catalonia’s western border):205 “It seems as if the sky is falling…In the city there is a 
nervousness that is logical up to a point, but its rationale is by no means acceptable.” It 
asserted that the people of Madrid, or Madrileños, also felt anxious when the war first 
breached their walls, because “the cruel reality overcame the most apathetic of 
temperaments; but it [Madrid] shook and shuddered; cast aside its distinctive calm and 
began to burn with anger, with rage, with self-denial, with violent passion.” It subsequently 
called for a similarly effective resistance to that seen in Madrid, reminding Catalonians just 
what was at stake. Interestingly, though the article was written in Spanish, it placed a great 
deal of emphasis on the value of the Catalan language:  
Do Catalonians understand what the triumph of the hordes presently advancing 
through Aragon would mean? Nothing more than this: suppression of all Catalan 
newspapers, disappearance of all books and texts written in Catalan from our shops, 
bookstores, public and private libraries; persecution of our striped flag; abolishment 
of radio broadcasts delivered in Catalan.206  
 
The “striped flag” referred, of course, to the Senyera, or Catalan national banner. The 
design, supposedly derived from the coat of arms of the Crown of Aragon, represents the 
communities of Catalonia, Aragon, Valencia, and the Balearic Islands. It consists of four 
red stripes atop a gold background and its usage dates back to the twelfth century. Its 
mysterious origins are steeped in legend and the flag has long been regarded as an 
important cultural symbol of Catalan pride.207 
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 The article then adopted a strikingly nationalist tone that spoke directly to 
Catalonians: “we speak of the purely Catalan because we address the Catalonians.” La 
Vanguardia subsequently stirred up the core sentiments of Catalan nationalism in order to 
promote regional resistance. It argued that the Second Spanish Republic fought for the 
preservation of democracy throughout the whole of Spain, and that Franco threatened still 
other values. The Catalonians must persevere for the sake of their unique language and 
culture: “What we mean to say is this: Now is the time, Catalonians–in the words of our 
nation’s hymn–now is the time to be alert…The character of Catalonia is in dispute like 
never before in our history. Her fate rests in the hands of all her children…” Such rallying 
cries to protect the homeland highlighted that the Republic fought to defend Spain, while 
the fascists fought to conquer Spain. Moreover, they contributed to the regional political 
discourse of the era, which may be defined as “a system of communicative practices that 
are integrally related to wider social and political practices, and that help to construct 
specific frameworks of thinking.”208 
 At one point La Vanguardia even featured a cartoon with the slogan “it’s better to 
die on your feet than to live on your knees.”209 The caption, while reminiscent of other 
revolutions, recalls the words of Mexico’s Emiliano Zapata in his fight against the 
dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz in 1910. La Vanguardia had covered the Mexican Revolution 
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extensively following its outbreak and the Spanish Republic still celebrated the ideals 
proclaimed by the Mexican Revolution (as most of them were similar to those proclaimed 
during the revolution in Spain). By the 1930s Zapata was considered a hero of the common 
man, especially for his most famous statement: “Quiero morir siendo esclavo de los 
principios, no de los hombres [I wish to die as a slave to principles, not to men].”210  
 In this way, La Vanguardia kept alive the Spanish Revolution of 1930, the 
progressive reforms instigated by the popularly elected government of the Republic, and 
the Catalonian thirst for regional autonomy and recognition as a rich cultural center of 
Spain. The War for Spanish Independence, as it was frequently called, thus became the 
ultimate battle “¡por la vida! [for life!],” “por tierra y libertad [for land and liberty],” and 
for the future and well-being of Spain’s most oppressed populations.211 La Vanguardia 
never let its readers forget the horrifying consequences of a Republican defeat. It constantly 
reminded them that resistance was their only option. In one such article it argued that “We 
have no choice, Spaniards: we cannot opt out. It is impossible. We stand between death 
and victory. And victory can only be obtained by means of resistance. We must resist, we 
must defend…” It then quoted the acclaimed verses of Bernardo Lopez García’s “Oda al 
Dos de Mayo [Ode to May 2],” originally written to honor the Spanish rebellion against 
the French occupation that sparked the Peninsular Wars (1808-1814): “one cannot enslave 
a nation that knows how to die.”212 Such calls for resistance often alluded to historical 
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precedent, whether it was the War of Spanish Succession or the Napoleonic invasion. It 
subsequently cultivated a sense of “collective memory” of the long-standing Spanish 
tradition of defiance to foreign domination and centralized power. As yet another article 
patriotically proclaimed, “the world shall learn, once again, what the Spanish people are 
capable of.”  
 Throughout the year it upped the stakes still further. The loss of Spanish democracy, 
it argued, would spell disaster for other democracies. The governments of France, Britain, 
and the United States would inevitably collapse. “The Spanish example,” as it was termed, 
was meant to ensure that the world’s democracies did not “die a terrible death.”213 As one 
article reaffirmed that December (1938), “Catalonia, throughout the course of its history, 
has invariably been the bastion of liberty and law.”214 In building upon the historical 
tradition of Catalan resistance to centralized power, La Vanguardia emphasized the 
devastating consequences of a Republican defeat. 
 On December 30, the newspaper dedicated nearly an entire page to a speech 
delivered by Lluis Companys to the “Catalan troops of the rearguard.” 215  In it he 
encouraged sustained resistance, urging readers to remember that “you are an important 
factor in the victory.” He argued that the protection of all parts of Catalonia (not just 
Barcelona) was vital to the outcome as “every inch of soil in Catalonia is like a piece of 
the Catalan soul.” A Fascist conquest would result in the loss of Catalan autonomy, for 
“Catalonia would be persecuted. Our songs, our language, our sweet memories, our soul, 
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everything we are now, what we were in the past, what we could be in the future.” He 
called for “all Catalans to defend our esteemed land!” and insisted: “I do not ask what you 
think of it. I ask if you are Catalan and I point out to you the imperative of duty.” In brief, 
this speech, which La Vanguardia described as “words of encouragement, of stimulus, and 
of hope to the Catalan soldiers,” prompted citizens to resist the approaching enemy “for 
Catalonia, for the Republic, and…for Liberty.”216   
 Lluis Companys began his career as a lawyer in Barcelona. Involved in leftist 
politics since his university days, he was elected President of Catalonia in 1933. Although 
he eventually became a fierce supporter of the Second Spanish Republic during the war, 
his relationship with the Republican administration was always rocky at best. In fact, in 
October of 1934 he had even staged a coup d’etat in which he ousted several elected 
members from their government positions and attempted to force the adoption of Catalan 
Nationalist policies. The act was deemed traitorous to the Republic and he was sentenced 
to thirty-five years in prison. Upon the declaration of the Spanish Civil War, however, the 
government pardoned him and permitted him to continue in his office as leader of 
Catalonia. He fled to France with his family in 1939 after the fall of Barcelona but was 
extradited to Madrid by Nazi officials. Franco sentenced him to execution by firing squad 
for treason in 1940.217  
 In January of 1939, the final month of Republican resistance in Barcelona, the tone 
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of the newspaper became feverish and frenzied. By January 15, an estimated one-third of 
Catalonia had surrendered to fascist occupation as the Nationalist Armies marched onward 
to Barcelona. The majority of international soldiers had been withdrawn from active duty 
and the Republic could not recover from its devastating losses in the Battle of the Ebro.218 
On January 8, Ángel Ossorio penned an article titled “The Failure of Logic” in which he 
appeared to downplay the role of reason.219 His argument was striking for the fact that 
Republicans generally boasted that their superior ideals were guided by rational thought 
while those of the fascist enemy were motivated by greed, medieval practices, and 
irrational interests. He began by quoting the Austrian writer, Stefan Zweig: “The heroic is 
always irrational and illogical and whenever a man or a nation undertake a mission that 
surpasses their real measure, their energies amount to a greater power they never thought 
possible.” He continued: “Logically, Spain, attacked by so many nations, betrayed by 
others and abandoned by almost everyone, should have perished from consumption long 
ago. Yet far from perishing, she has rebuilt the machinery of the State, begotten a grand 
army, and established in wartime industries she never achieved in times of peace and quiet. 
What purpose has logic served? None.” In this way, Ossorio did not simply cast away 
reason, he rejected it outright, arguing that it served no “purpose.” He described the tide of 
the war as belonging to a greater destiny, as something beyond the comprehension of 
mankind. “Divine providence?,” he asked, “Impetus of fate? Mere coincidence? Think 
whatever you like, but we all harbor the conviction that our destiny rises far above the laws 
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of logic.” He closed his argument with the words: “I surrender. I’d rather not go back to 
speculating about the war in Spain. With respect to that, I’ll just close my eyes, declare 
myself a disciple of the University of Cervera, and recant the ‘disastrous mania of 
thinking.’”  
 The University of Cervera, originally constructed in 1717 to reward the city for its 
support of Philip V in the War of Spanish Succession (as well as to punish the rest of 
Catalonia for its alliance with the Hapsburgs) was a prominent institution that closed its 
doors permanently in 1835.220 The “funesta manía de pensar” refers to the famous words 
supposedly delivered by the University’s rector during the royal visit of Fernando VII in 
the early nineteenth century, at which point he stated “nothing is further from our intention, 
your majesty, than the disastrous mania of thinking.” Though the precise words of the 
encounter have been heavily disputed by scholars, they form part of a popular cultural story 
in Spain and the quote is still frequently cited.221 
 Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo was a distinguished Spanish intellectual of his time. The 
self-proclaimed “Christian, conservative, and attorney” had served under Alfonso XIII, 
Miguel Primo de Rivera, and the Second Spanish Republic in various capacities as 
statesman, minister, and lawyer. He authored a number of influential works, one of which 
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detailed the history of Catalan political thought in the late eighteenth century. Despite his 
conservative views and his displeasure with the anticlerical policies legislated by the 
Republican government, he emerged as an outspoken proponent of Spanish democracy so 
that he was once famously described as “a monarchist without a king.” Additionally, his 
passion for rationalism and justice over the course of his illustrious career earned him the 
reputation of “Pope of jurisprudence.” As a close personal friend of Prime Minister Manuel 
Azaña222 and long-time resident of Barcelona, he faithfully served as an expert on the 
political and cultural challenges afoot in Catalonia.223  
 Throughout the war, La Vanguardia at once praised and pleaded for Spanish 
resistance to the fascist insurgents. Every citizen was made out to be significant and 
essential to a Republican victory. Even as battles were waged and lost, territories 
conquered, and tens of thousands of refugees forced to flee their homes, La Vanguardia 
stood behind the popularly elected government in declaring that sustained resistance could 
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still save Catalonia, Spain, and all of Europe. By January 1939, Barcelona’s situation had 
become desperate. It was cut off from the major supply lines of the Republic and denied 
vital foreign assistance from supposed allies as Catalonia fell piece by piece to the fascist 
threat. Despite this, La Vanguardia continued to publish inspiring (if outlandish) articles 
referring to the “magnificent Spanish resistance” of soldiers and civilians alike.224 By the 
end, these pleas for resistance against all odds demonstrated the “failure of reason” writers 
like Ángel Ossorio so passionately defended. 
 
Theme Two: False Republican Advances and Victories 
 La Vanguardia reported a great deal on Republican victories and advances 
throughout the civil war, fulfilling a number of important functions: first, it kept 
Barcelona’s citizens informed of the war’s progress and relevant current affairs; second, it 
helped to rekindle the people’s hope in the midst of a dark moment in their nation’s history; 
third, it inspired faith and confidence in the elected leaders of the Republic; and fourth, it 
emboldened quotidian resistance to rebel insurgents. This sort of reporting is unsurprising 
in light of the war’s pivotal role in the daily lives of Spaniards, all of whom were 
immediately impacted in a variety of ways. Many had lost their homes, others had bid 
farewell to loved ones sent to the front, and rich and poor alike were literally starving. In 
Barcelona and Madrid, Spain’s two major Republican cities, the affliction of hunger was 
particularly severe and would endure for years after the war’s conclusion in a period now 
famously remembered as “los años de hambre” [the years of hunger], in which an estimated 
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200,000 people died of starvation.225  
 Of special interest, however, is how this theme evolved over the course of events. 
La Vanguardia never fully admitted to the crushing losses suffered by Republican forces 
at the height of the war, downplayed the significance of fascist victories, denied rumors of 
growing disunity within their ranks and Spain’s liberal coalitions, and outright lied about 
the impossibility of their defeat even up to the day before Barcelona’s official surrender. 
Instead, reporters framed Republican military campaigns as highly efficient and organized, 
government officials as responsible and diligent, and the “fight for liberty” as heroic, 
effective, and unified on all fronts, despite the fact that most evidence suggested otherwise: 
“The Sacred Union of the Anti-Fascist Front: Discipline, Unity of action, Professional 
Army, Singular Command.”226 In late 1936, when it became apparent that the Spanish 
National Army posed an imminent threat to the survival of Spanish democracy that could 
not be ignored, La Vanguardia began regularly publishing articles detailing Republican 
military achievements such as that which appeared on November 25, 1936: “The enemy 
keeps pushing, without success, on the Central sectors. The fascist factions, in their 
impotence, fire at several Madrid settlements without making a single hit. Our troops, in a 
vigorous advance toward Pinto, have harshly punished the rebels.”227 
 Still, in mid 1937, months after the devastation of Guernica and the unrelenting 
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assaults on major Basque cities, La Vanguardia maintained they had not lost the north to 
the fascists. In a government message addressing the Spanish public printed on June 22, 
1937, the headline read: “Bilbao has been evacuated. But Euzkadi has not been 
defeated.”228 A blatant lie, Barcelona’s readers must have been skeptical. For the citizens 
of Bilbao, the largest city in the Basque country and a major industrial center, to be forcibly 
removed from their homes would have certainly appeared grim to onlookers, yet La 
Vanguardia refused to admit defeat. Rather, over the coming year as Catalonia came 
directly under siege, the newspaper continued to proclaim the Republic as the war’s 
indisputable victor despite the thousands of refugees entering Barcelona following the 
destruction of nearby cities and villages. Even on January 3, 1939, less than a month before 
Barcelona’s total collapse, La Vanguardia featured the following article on its front page: 
“The Spanish soldiers continue dealing enormous blows to the invading armies.”229  
 It is not difficult to imagine why La Vanguardia worked so hard to deceive readers 
about the reality of the Republican war effort. Some might call its writers unethical, 
dishonest, or even delusional, but none of the original reporters or editors survive to 
account for their actions or explain their motivations. Upon their defeat, a few were 
executed, others imprisoned, and most barred from ever working again in Spanish media. 
Their director spent forty days in prison and received a lifetime ban from the press.230 
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When asked to comment on her experience, she only replied “los tiempos de guerra no 
dejaron recuerdos, sino heridas” [“the war did not leave memories, so much as wounds”], 
and refused to elaborate further.231  
 According to Storr, “Whether a belief is considered to be a delusion or not depends 
partly upon the intensity with which it is defended, and partly upon the numbers of people 
subscribing to it.”232 Perhaps they still believed that they could win over the hearts and 
minds of Barcelona’s suffering citizens, a cultured and liberal people, and win the war, 
even if only in part, by convincing them of the fortitude of democratic ideals. Or perhaps 
they simply believed it was the right thing to do, echoing the sentiments of Salamanca’s 
celebrated Miguel de Unamuno, a Basque professor dismissed from his post by the 
Falangists in 1936 for his bold opposition to Franco: “If it is nothingness that awaits us, let 
us make an injustice of it; let us fight against destiny, even though without hope of victory; 
let us fight against it quixotically.”233 Either way, this theme appears to constitute an 
important aspect of collective action frames: that of the “prognostic” frame by way of its 
presentation of a solution to those problems proposed in the “diagnostic” frame.234  
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 La Vanguardia openly supported the Republican armies, daily celebrating their 
supposed victories and advances. It never attempted a neutral voice in the conflict. Rather, 
it cultivated a highly personal and emotional style that enthusiastically embraced the 
newfound democratic freedoms of the Spanish Republic. By 1938, the newspaper even 
included notes in the margins outright praising the government forces and their supreme 
resolve. La Vanguardia expressed absolute trust in its generals and soldiers. To evidence 
this unmistakable stand it asserted at the start of the new year: “La Vanguardia initiates its 
work in this year of 1938 wishing for great prosperity for our readers and for a decisive 
victory by the Republican Army to secure the liberty and independence of Spain.”235  
 Moreover, it emphatically dismissed any rumors of schism or conflict within the 
Republican administration: “No, there is no political crisis, there is no crisis of 
government…because that would certainly be a tremendous accusation.”236 It suggested 
that such rumors derived from a lack of responsibility and a “repulsive frivolity,” for surely 
it would be against their interests to concern themselves with the specific “interests of this 
or that party, this or that organization, this or that family.” After all, the Republican 
Government’s primary objective was “to save the Republic, to protect Spain as a free, 
independent, and dignified nation.” By supporting the Republican government and military 
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so thoroughly in both coverage and tone, the newspaper established itself as the “true” 
voice of democratic values and communicated to readers that it favored their interests 
above all else in the fight against foreign tyrants. 
 A cartoon by Luis Bagaría published the same day similarly emphasized the rise of 
a new and stronger Spain. Titled “The New Year,” it depicts a baby hatching from an egg, 
a laurel of victory in his extended hand. The sun shines brilliantly in the background while 
small, frowning toads look upon him in despair. The caption below reads “Hurrah! The 
toads can do nothing against the Republic!” 237  Bagaría was a prominent political 
caricaturist who drew a series of cartoons in Spanish newspapers throughout the war, a 
number of which appeared in La Vanguardia. Ironically, he once gave a lecture in Bilbao 
in which he asserted: “The majority of humorists are sad men; true humor is not the flower 
of youth, it is the product of prolonged pain, the pain of having been born, the conviction 
of our ridiculous smallness, the feeling of having lost faith in the beyond and to have to 
feel die within oneself the ideal of the redemption of the human race…humor is a flower 
born of pessimism.”238 
 The surrounding articles described the enormous victories in Teruel. “All attempts 
to infiltrate the stronghold have been totally rebuffed,” one headline claimed, “we have 
also rebuffed all attacks undertaken by the enemy on the rest of the front.”239 In late 
February, La Vanguardia continued to celebrate advances in the Battle of Teruel with 
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statements such as “our success dealt a terrible blow to the adversary,” “the ups and downs 
of the developing operations there produce a positive result,” and “we conquered the 
fortified city within a week.” The newspaper attributed such victories to the possession of 
“an army not only animated by a spirit and enthusiasm that in the first months allowed it 
to face a superior enemy, but also endowed it with the necessary conditions to undertake 
successfully the riskiest and most difficult enterprises from the point of view of military 
technique.”240 In one article from February 22 (the final day of the battle), it wrote “a 
glorious day for the Republican Air Force; before Teruel they viciously fight.”241 It went 
on to describe the events on the Eastern front: “Today, in the difficult defense of Teruel for 
the positions surrounding the stronghold taken by the enemy, there were episodes of 
extraordinary heroism, as they have maintained intact the lines of defense set by the 
command.”  
 While La Vanguardia appeared to admit defeat in Teruel the following day, it did 
not actually change its tune: 
The mass offensive of artillery and aviation executed by Germany and Italy in the 
service of Franco, has proved superior to the resistance accumulated by our army 
in Teruel. That is the plain fact which explains the evacuation of this stronghold. 
As a result of our troops taking it and desperately counterattacking the rebels, the 
Government is proud to emphasize the significance of the operation, but also warns 
that whatever the final results of the Battle of Teruel, the main tactical goal, which 
was to foil an attack on Madrid, has been achieved.242 
 
The newspaper thus reconstructed the crushing loss as a victory. The armies may have been 
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forced ultimately to surrender Teruel, it argued, but they managed to save Madrid from yet 
another vicious attack in the process. It was this, all along, that was the primary objective 
of the operation. It then announced the battle’s conclusion, stating that “it is no longer 
worthwhile to continue the fight in Teruel, even though our forces know heroically how to 
counter the effective tactics of the enemy.” In this way, La Vanguardia repeatedly extolled 
the extreme skill, bravery, and competency of the Republican armed forces, thereby 
promoting public faith in a favorable outcome. 
 The Battle of Teruel, so named for the capital city of a poor Aragonese province 
where the majority of fighting took place, marked a decisive turning point in the Spanish 
Civil War. It began in late 1937 and lasted almost exactly two months during the most 
brutal Spanish winter in decades, forcing soldiers to labor in conditions that “were almost 
Siberian.”243 Located at a high elevation in a mountainous region bordering the Pyrenees 
some 3,000 feet above sea level, Teruel records the lowest annual temperatures in Spain. 
Its relative isolation from neighboring territories has made it a valuable fortress city since 
the days of the Moorish occupation. The battle started as a Republican offensive to regain 
control of the northern provinces that had fallen earlier that year. Although a fairly minor 
settlement, Teruel had recently been rebranded a symbol of Nationalist power in Aragon, 
and the Republican Army sought to recapture their lost regional strongholds in the 
northeast. Additionally, according to scholars, rumors circulated that Franco planned to 
launch another aviation assault on Madrid on December 18 and so the Republic hoped to 
distract him with a preemptive strike on December 15. Initially bold and successful, 
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Republican forces did alarm their opponents as they managed to breach the city walls and 
push back the fascist lines. However, they were severely outnumbered in manpower and 
weaponry. Franco, who did not lack such resources, was able to concentrate his tanks and 
artillery on the Levante Front, resulting in staggering losses for the Republic. The defeat at 
Teruel is widely regarded as the battle that cost them the war.244 
 This trend continued throughout the year as the chances of an already elusive 
victory completely withered away. As late as October La Vanguardia published the 
following headline about the Battle of the Ebro: “Our positions improve south of Venta de 
Camposines: The enemy has suffered many setbacks and has lost four fighter planes and a 
two-engine plane, Spanish troops make an important advance in the Toledo sector.”245 The 
Battle of the Ebro, now solemnly described as “una huella imborrable de la Guerra Civil” 
[an unforgettable wound of the Civil War],246 was the longest and bloodiest battle of the 
war. It spanned nearly five months and claimed the lives of over 100,000 people.247 The 
battle was widely regarded as a disaster for the Republic, as it cost them enormous amounts 
of soldiers and supplies and ultimately did little to impede the advancement of Nationalist 
troops. Its conclusion marked the beginning stages of the Catalan Offensive that winter. 
Moreover, it had become apparent by October that the Republicans were not advancing, as 
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they claimed, but retreating. In redrawing serious setbacks as improvements, La 
Vanguardia boldly lied to readers. It appeared to believe that the truth would dishearten its 
audience and weaken the resistance, so it reacted by promoting hope and enthusiasm, 
painting a picture of certain victory much like a light beyond a tunnel of darkness. 
 The Battle of the Ebro officially ended on November 16, 1938.248 The following 
day, La Vanguardia wrote: “The Government makes public the real score of the glorious 
operation in the Ebro”: 
The Republican government does not forsake its well-known Spanish virtue of 
calling things by their proper name...In war, when objectives are met, commanders 
have the right to express delight…The diversion has cost the enemy 80,000 losses, 
200 planes, and an enormous sum of material. We have also experienced substantial 
losses, much less than our adversary, but with them we have gained four months of 
organization and resistance and we have cleared the Levante Front.249 
 
Such lies were likely apparent to readers located in Barcelona who witnessed the influx of 
thousands of refugees from elsewhere in Catalonia and the Basque Country. However, 
Republican forces were effective in limiting communication between soldiers on the front 
and their friends and families back home. Letters were intercepted and soldiers on leave 
were frequently arrested upon their return before they had the chance to discuss their 
experiences with civilians.250 
 Interestingly, La Vanguardia never sugar-coated the brutality of war or glorified 
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the bloodshed. It certainly praised the fallen and their great sacrifices, but it never 
celebrated the violence. In fact, it regularly condemned traditional notions of war as being 
full of pride and wonder. It thought of war as imperialistic and domineering, much like 
Franco. The war Republicans fought, it argued, was a defensive one to preserve Spanish 
culture and values, to protect the working classes and their new-found democratic liberties. 
In this way, La Vanguardia continued to assert Manuel Azaña’s 1936 plea to Spaniards 
that they uphold the “legitimate power of the nation…for the reestablishment of justice, 
liberty, the validity of the Constitution, and the Republican spirit.”251  
 The Media as Guardian of Democracy Frame fortified La Vanguardia's position as 
a genuine voice for the Second Spanish Republic in the fight against Fascism. It thus 
framed the free press as integral to the survival of democratic ideals in Spain. The next 
chapter analyzes how La Vanguardia’s wartime framing spoke not only to the 
contemporary locals it sought to recruit but also to a revolutionary future.  
 
                                                 




 Figure 3.1 La Vanguardia’s masthead from September 10, 1936-January 25, 1939. 














Figure 3.2 “La actualidad de una frase” [The Timeliness of an Expression] by 
Luis Bagaría in La Vanguardia, April 10, 1938. The caption beneath it reads “Better to 

















Figure 3.3 “Año Nuevo” [New Year] by Luís Bagaría in La Vanguardia, January 










 Barcelona finally surrendered to Franco’s forces on January 26, 1939. It was the 
first time in years that the press fell uniformly silent.252 The next day, La Vanguardia 
reappeared with a new message and suspended leadership. 253  “Barcelona for the 
indomitable Spain of Franco!,” it proclaimed. “Today, La Vanguardia renews its 
publication, recovering, at long last, the rhythm it lost two and a half years ago.”254 La 
Vanguardia no longer operated in “the service of democracy.” Instead the masthead read, 
Diario al servicio de España y del Generalísimo Franco [Newspaper in the service of 
Spain and the Great General Franco]. It declared itself “liberated” by the “inherent 
heroism of Franco and the savior National Army,” and expressed an “ardent desire to serve 
Spain, the immortal Spain, the eternal Spain.” Most strikingly, it concluded: “For now, we 
erase the past…we stand at attention, as one more soldier, to do your bidding. Long live 
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Spain! Onward, Spain! Long Live the Great General Franco!”255 Subsequent editions were 
titled La Vanguardia Española [The Spanish Vanguard], effectively erasing any lingering 
public connection to the Catalan culture and identity it once promoted.  
 The fall of Barcelona spelled the fall of the Second Spanish Republic. Madrid, 
deprived of its most powerful ally-city, eventually succumbed to Franco on April 1, 1939, 
officially ending the Spanish Civil War. Under the new Fascist leadership, most Barcelona-
based newspapers closed down, but La Vanguardia was maintained, likely because of its 
perceived local influence and wide readership. As Robert E. Park once stated, “The power 
of the press may be roughly measured by the number of people who read it.”256 It is not a 
stretch, therefore, to assume that Franco found it worthwhile to redefine the newspaper’s 
mission rather than destroy it entirely. 
 The Second Spanish Republic (1931-1939) demonstrated a radical break with 
Spanish society and institutions. The suppressed voices and ideas that had been brutally 
silenced by conventional power structures finally erupted in an almost unstoppable flood 
of novelty and enthusiasm. Barcelona’s La Vanguardia was among the voices that reflected 
a desire for profound change and for a new and modern Spain not shackled to the 
oppressive traditions of the past. As Antonio Machado, one of Spain’s most illustrious 
poets of the twentieth century, wrote for La Vanguardia in March of 1938:  
If we consider the ideal reversibility of the past and the plasticity of the future, there 
is no trouble converting history into a novel without losing any of the essentials. 
Only in this way can we shake the tyranny of the anecdotal and circumstantial. We 
do not believe there is sufficient reason to accept the fatalism of the past. We 
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realize, however, that the Determinists have never conceded that the past could 
have been otherwise, or even that there could be many versions. Because they do 
not allow for freedom of the future and so with double the force they must also 
deny it to the past.257 
 
Machado, a literary giant and political activist of the Spanish left, had penned a classic 
poem just a few years earlier detailing this concept of “the two Spains” which had occupied 
Spanish political discourse for well over a century: “There is a Spaniard who wants/ to live 
and so he begins to live/ between a Spain that dies/ and another Spain that sighs/ Little 
Spaniard now coming into the world/ may God protect you./ One of the two Spains/ is 
about to freeze your heart.”258 Interestingly, his own family demonstrated this split, as his 
brother (also a distinguished writer) sided with the Nationalists in 1936.259 Mariano José 
de Larra, another poet, had expressed a similar idea exactly one hundred earlier when he 
wrote of a nightmarish stroll through the cemetery that contained Spain’s tombstone. “Here 
lies half of Spain,” it read, “the other half killed it.”260  
 Machado’s article expressed the same idea that had appeared in La Vanguardia on 
a daily basis. Machado maintained that the Spanish Civil War marked a battle between 
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autocracy and democracy and between foreign adversaries and the legitimate state 
government, but he also defined the conflict as part of the endless struggle between old and 
new, past and future, tradition and innovation. As Foucault points out, when enough time 
has passed, established power structures assume the status of “natural” and “inherent” in 
the style of divine right, religious authority, or class distinctions: 
Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as 
and when it occurs. These pre-existing forms of continuity, all these syntheses that 
are accepted without question…They must not be rejected definitely of course, but 
the tranquility with which they are accepted must be disturbed; we must show that 
they do not come about of themselves, but are always the result of a construction 
the rules of which must be known, and the justifications of which must be 
scrutinized.261 
 
Franco’s message was essentially one of recreating Spain’s “glorious” history in the 
modern era so as to “make Spain great again.” La Vanguardia, meanwhile, called for the 
creation of a radically different society that better served the general population. A major 
clash occurred when part of the country sought refuge in a fixed past while the other aspired 
to a moldable future. As Manuel Azaña asked himself in 1932, “The thrill of history and 
the natural combine. From this, could a new history arise?”262 
 Even in the darkest of times, La Vanguardia refused to admit defeat not because it 
was so foolish or delusional, but because the cost of defeat was so devastating. As Nathan 
Crick argues, “For if to be human means anything, it means to assert one’s character even 
in the face of catastrophe, confident in the knowledge that no life is a catastrophe that has 
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a place within a composed tale of meanings.”263 For decades, Spaniards suffered under a 
dictatorship that enforced “tradition” at the cost of civil liberties. Despite Franco’s victory, 
however, the Second Spanish Republic and its advocates had left an indelible mark on the 
future course of Spain. Immediately following his death in 1975, Spaniards reinstated a 
democratic government that has since survived two military coups. The nationalist 
movements of Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country have resurged in full force. The 
Catholic Church, once the ultimate authority, has been relegated to a position of relatively 
little influence. Education and other institutions have undergone radical reforms. Indeed, it 
seems Miguel de Unamuno, the acclaimed philosopher and academic who served as rector 
of the University of Salamanca, was correct when he told Franco’s representatives that 
“you will win because you have more than enough brute force, but you will not convince. 
To convince you must persuade and to persuade you must have what you lack: reason and 
right in the struggle.”264 These words destroyed Unamuno’s career in 1936, but they are 
now celebrated as the foundation of democratic ideals in Spain. 
 The frames composed by La Vanguardia emerged at the beginning of the war in 
1936, but became especially articulate and profound over the course of 1938. In essence, 
La Vanguardia asserted that Spain had fallen victim to Spanish traitors and greedy 
foreigners who sought to overthrow the legitimate government. It declared in no uncertain 
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terms that the loss of the Republic meant the loss of human progress and civilization. The 
“Battle for Spain,” La Vanguardia argued, was the battle for the world. In this way, the 
two frames analyzed in this thesis, though distinct, underwent similar transformations in 
the final year of the war. Both intensified until they seemed frenzied and feverish as the 
end drew near. There are several possible explanations for this. First, as framing theorists 
have stated, frames tend to become more conscious and developed over time. Second, by 
nature frames are not fixed or stable but are always evolving to stay relevant. Third, as 
Crick and Rhodes suggest, “eloquence arises out of a confrontation with death.”265    
 Crick and Rhodes wrote their article “Eloquence and Death” in reference to the 
individual forced to confront his own mortality, but I believe this idea can also extend to 
groups and collective identities. After all, they pose that “at the root of eloquence is the 
power to begin anew–and to achieve immortality–despite the knowledge that our actual 
lives must end.”266 La Vanguardia explicitly sought to “begin anew,” especially in the face 
of death. The growing prospect of defeat proved stimulating rather than stifling. The 
newspaper became more, not less, articulate as the war progressed. Framing theory 
provided me with a lens through which to see this evolution of thought as the themes and 
ideas dominating its coverage sharpened in desperation. 
 The task of the historian to uncover the past that is all but lost to us is both a blessing 
and a curse. On the one hand, the discovery and analysis of such discourses lends insight 
into the present-day structures and systems we take for granted. On the other, it reinforces 
                                                 







the sense that we are prone to make the same mistakes. The Spanish Civil War ended 
seventy-eight years ago, yet we see similar discourses emerging to address today’s crises. 
In the United States, for example, the political parties remain divided as to whether the 
solution lies in “tradition” or in “progress.” A similar debate has taken hold of Spain, in 
which no single party has been able to gain a decisive majority for several consecutive 
elections.  
 Consequently, Foucault’s quest “to free the history of thought from its subjection 
to transcendence” remains as relevant today as when he first conceived of it in 1972.267 
“We must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its sudden irruption,” as 
discourse does not reflect the reality of the world, but the human perception of that reality 
which is constantly in flux.268 If anything, the case of La Vanguardia demonstrates that 
political discourse, though malleable, is unstoppable. The distinctive voices that contribute 
to it rise and fall along with the power structures that represent them. They can be silenced 
for a time, but they tend to reemerge as societies transform to address an ever-changing 
world. Franco may have succeeded in stomping out Spanish democracy during his lifetime, 
but he failed to reestablish Spain’s autocratic institutions in the long run. As Foucault 
articulates best of all: “Discourse is not life: its time is not your time; in it, you will not be 
reconciled to death; you may have killed God beneath the weight of all that you have said; 
but don’t imagine that, with all that you are saying, you will make a man that will live 
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longer than he.”269   
 Collective action frames are unique for the fact that they tend to emerge in moments 
of change and power shifts. Consequently, the qualitative study of such frames also 
involves the study of rhetoric, though some will dispute this claim. Rhetoric, in its most 
basic form, refers to “the strategic use of communication, oral or written, to achieve 
specifiable goals…it is employed only when words can make a difference.”270 Kuypers has 
argued extensively that news framing analysis can (and should) be viewed from a rhetorical 
perspective, as news writers use rhetoric in the construction of frames. 271  As mass 
communication framing theorists Snow and Benford, and Johnston and Noakes also point 
out, “collective action frames offer strategic interpretations of issues with the intention of 
mobilizing people to act.” Snow and Benford identify three core framing tasks: diagnostic, 
prognostic, and motivational. Diagnostic framing presents a diagnosis of the perceived 
problem. Prognostic framing proposes a solution to the stated problem. Motivational 
framing gives people a reason or an incentive to join collective action. All three 
components provide the foundations of collective action frames and all three were present 
in La Vanguardia’s wartime coverage in the attempt to inspire resistance in a losing 
cause.272  
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 Some have posed that the extreme optimism present in Republican propaganda 
resulted in a sense of over-confidence on behalf of the public that led to defeat, but no 
studies confirm or even correlate such assertions. However, it appears that in recent years 
a strong distrust of the “liberal media” persists in democratic societies that may affect 
contemporary interpretations of an activist press. Kuypers, for example, fiercely maintains 
that “an activist press is a danger to democratic society.”273 He contends that “the press has 
distinctly moved away from its perceived tradition of objective news reporting, placing one 
foot within the realm of social responsibility and one foot within the realm of social 
activism,” thus “manipulating politics.”274 In selectively reducing the scope of information 
delivered in news coverage, he claims, the media undermine the democracy they swear to 
uphold by hindering citizens’ abilities to make independent and fully informed 
decisions. 275  Although he limits his discussion to American journalism, he raises an 
interesting question regarding journalistic practices “in the service of democracy.”276  
 The concept that media have the “social responsibility” of providing readers with 
“all the facts” of a given situation in an objectively truthful way so that they may make 
informed decisions about issues is what cultural media historians like Carey would likely 
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call today’s “idea of the report” in democratic societies. As Park indicated as early as 1923, 
“the press, as it exists, is not, as our moralists sometimes seem to assume, the willful 
product of any little group of living men…The natural history of the press…is an account 
of the conditions under which the existing newspaper has grown up and taken form.”277 
The “idea of the report,” having changed significantly over time and space, consequently 
influences the framing processes evident in the particular newspapers of particular eras. 
 When speculating as to what role the media should play in democratic countries 
such as the United States, many scholars and theorists have discussed the issues of tone, 
content, and general standards but, in reality, the debate goes much deeper than people 
realize. As Hart explains: “A basic question is whether or not the news should have a voice 
of its own. If the news is a mere conduit, after all, a neutral medium that passes along the 
nation’s dialogue, its texts should be self-denying...The reporter would be little more than 
a scribe.”278 Should democratic newspapers express opinions or stick merely to “the facts”? 
What characterizes propaganda and should they be allowed to use it? What types of 
circumstances, if any, render it acceptable to lie to readers concerning important events in 
world affairs? Does the reporting of those events necessitate interpretation? Can a free 
press successfully battle totalitarianism in times of crisis, or does its liberty of opinion and 
subsequent “disunity” place it at a unique disadvantage?  
 According to Hart, “the press assumes...that facts are inchoate, inexpressible on 
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their own terms; that politics dies unless dramatized; and that traditional news norms ensure 
an enlightened polity.”279 If this is the case, then La Vanguardia may have subscribed to 
the view that without the dramatization of events–the exaggeration of military triumphs, 
the sentimental speeches praising the Republic, the fierce condemnation of fascist troops 
and their leaders, the romanticization of the Catalan proletariat–they could not sustain the 
active Republican Resistance for which Barcelona is now famously remembered in a city 
which became increasingly vulnerable and unstable with each passing day. Kate Adie, 
chief news correspondent for BBC News, once posed the famous question: “When does a 
reporter sacrifice the principle of the whole truth to the need to win the war?” The truth, 
however, cannot be so simple, as the news tends to be more manifold than critics care to 
admit: “The news is a complex thing. In reality, it is not one thing but many things. It is 
both herald and critic, soothsayer and cultural historian, and its text contains a congeries of 
voices.”280 It is precisely this “congeries of voices” captured by contemporary media that 
provides insight into those political discourses of the past. 
 During the Spanish Civil War, La Vanguardia was confronted with a singular 
battle: that of communicating resistance in a losing cause. More likely than not, reporters 
and readers alike understood by late 1938 that the resistance was a matter of valiantly 
postposing the inevitable, for as the Republic weakened, Franco’s forces grew in strength 
and number. One element La Vanguardia did not misrepresent, however, was Barcelona’s 
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status as a critical fortress city of the Republic. Its loss preceded by just two months the 
end of the war.281 Barcelona had put up such a powerful defense, in fact, that Franco 
punished Catalonia by leaving the devastated capital in rubble for over a decade. For the 
next thirty-six years, Catalonians would be forced to suppress any manifestation of pride 
in their culture, language, or heritage, a factor likely stimulating the secession movement 
taking place today (a cause the newspaper presently supports). 
 La Vanguardia may have failed along with the Second Spanish Republic it so 
ardently defended, but its wartime editions survive as a profound testament to the struggle 
for Spanish democracy and the media discourses that framed it. The master frames and 
their respective themes emerged early on and intensified as the war progressed, often to the 
point of incredulity as the sense of impending doom began to seep in. As discussed at 
length in this thesis, the frames constructed by La Vanguardia were not entirely truthful. 
They distorted events to give the appearance of a more favorable outcome to the war. 
Above all, its message remained “we cannot lose the war” because the consequences would 
be too devastating to fathom.282 La Vanguardia’s Republican publications represented the 
long-suppressed voice of a “New Spain” not to be overshadowed by the oppressive and 
imperialist past that Franco sought to resurrect. 
 According to Foucault, “one cannot speak of anything at any time; it is not easy to 
say something new” as the “conditions required for the appearance of an object of 
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discourse…are many and imposing.” 283  For the first time in Spain’s history, liberal 
newspapers found themselves in a position of power in which they were permitted to voice 
the progressive ideals that drove them. When Franco and his forces rose up against the new 
authority in the name of “tradition,” Republican media were reluctant to relinquish their 
newfound liberty of coverage, thought, and even dissent. Instead, newspapers like La 
Vanguardia and their sympathizers resisted the shift backward, causing a “sudden 
irruption” in the “infinite continuity of discourse.”284 
 Like Benford and Snow, this thesis views “ideology as a cultural resource for 
framing activity.”285 It should be noted that ideology remains distinct from framing, but 
the two are undoubtedly linked, as framing processes are shaped by the ideological 
constraints in which they take place. As Westby argues: “Framing is thereby formulated as 
a jointly constituted process, as discourse that conjoins the ideological and the strategic.”286 
Interestingly, however, this perspective on framing “has not inspired much theoretical 
attention” despite its potential to illuminate the cultural history of democratic traditions of 
journalism.287 My research contributes to this understudied approach to news framing 
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analysis in applying it to the frames inspired by a radical irruption in Spanish history. In so 
doing, this study explores the profound interaction between media framing and the 
ideological shifts that affect political communication. 
 My objective in this thesis has been to highlight those frames present in the news 
coverage of Catalonia’s capital newspaper during the final year of the Spanish Civil War, 
to analyze what they suggested about the Republican political discourse of the era, and to 
explain the social and environmental factors that appeared to influence their emergence 
and development. To echo Sloan and Stamm: “Our questions cannot be limited to the press 
alone, for the press exists in society…The fact of interaction between media and society 
has to be one of the fundamentals of communication history.” 288  Because historical 
periodicals offer a kind of snapshot into the past, frames serve as a useful tool in the 
identification of the ideological shifts that have marked world history and shaped 
contemporary institutions.  
 In La Vanguardia’s wartime framing, the battle for Spain emerged not solely as a 
battle for liberty and democracy, but for the progress of world culture and civilization. In 
1938 the majority of Western democracies were still in their infancy and struggling to grow 
and stabilize in the aftermath of a world war and world depression that threatened to topple 
Europeans right back into the monarchical structures that had led them to the brink of 
devastation in the first place. While Canada, Great Britain, and the United States boasted 
strong democracies, they appeared to falter before their more aggressive adversaries, 
leading some to question their effectiveness. Spanish democracy challenged the authority 
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of Spain’s most established institutions: the monarchy, the Catholic Church, and the 
military. The Second Spanish Republic did not just grasp this radical break with the past, 
it celebrated it. Republicans proclaimed the dream of a “New Spain” that was egalitarian, 
secular, and fair. Their enemies, meanwhile, fought to maintain “tradition” and the “status 
quo” and to roll back the liberal efforts that made democracy possible. Foucault argues that 
“tradition enables us to isolate the new against a background of permanence, and to transfer 
its merit to originality, to genius, to the decisions proper to individuals.”289 In this way, La 
Vanguardia effectively positioned Barcelona at the center of the Spanish Republican 
political discourse. It cultivated the image of a unified city racing toward victory. As 
Foucault’s theory would argue, then, the political discourse captured in these frames 
simplified the war into a battle being fought out between two forces and two ideologies: 
the Germans and the Italians against the Spanish, the old against the new.  
 In actuality, Barcelona stood at the center of Republican disorder and chaos. Riots 
and demonstrations erupted on a regular basis, mobs and vandalism were rampant, and an 
atmosphere of suspicion overwhelmed the city to the point that citizens desperately feared 
denouncement by their own neighbors. Even those foreigners who fought so valiantly for 
the Republic would return from the front only to be arrested by rival factions. Radical 
socialists challenged less radical socialists, socialists challenged anarchists, and anarchists 
challenged liberals and progressives, so that Barcelona quickly gained a reputation of 
anarchy and unrest. Such events periodically disrupted operations in Barcelona, leading to 
the infamous “May Days” or “May Events” of 1937, during which Republican factions 
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viciously battled one another in the streets for control of the local government.290 
 La Vanguardia, in line with its prized Republic, framed a persuasive yet ineffectual 
appeal to western democracies. Its message was simple: The Spanish Civil War was not a 
civil war but the beginning of World War II. Spain, after centuries of oppression, sought 
to emulate the democratic systems of Great Britain and the United States. This, it argued, 
should make Spain a welcome friend to support and protect, but instead Spaniards found 
themselves neglected and ignored. The newspaper posed many of the same questions as 
the Brigaders: why did British and American leaders appear to favor their enemies when it 
was so clearly against their better interests? How could they fail to recognize the strategic 
importance of Spain in the European theatre? After all, it was evident from the outset that 
it was only a matter of time before the fascist attitudes embodied by Hitler and Mussolini 
directly threatened the democratic regimes of France and England. Although the Non-
Intervention Pact showed no indication of ever being lifted, La Vanguardia continued to 
plead for international assistance and presented to readers the impression that, despite their 
apparent reluctance, the allies would eventually come to Spain’s defense.  
 The final year of the Spanish Civil War marked the death of an era. Even the liberal 
values so prized by the Republic came under siege as the conflict intensified. The great 
revolutionary city of Barcelona succumbed to fear, desperation, and corruption as prospects 
became increasingly bleak. As Orwell famously observed, “The fact is that every war 
suffers a kind of progressive degradation with every month that it continues, because such 
things as individual liberty and a truthful press are simply not compatible with military 
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efficiency.”291 Telling the “truth” under such circumstances would have been a challenging 
task, as not only did the truth contradict its vision of a free and progressive Spanish society, 
but it also disrupted the international “face” it sought to project to outsiders as upstanding, 
strong, and unified. It appears, then, that La Vanguardia’s “idea of the report” in 1938 was 
the magnification of a beam of hope meant to ignite the spark of resistance and to inspire 
endurance in the darkest of times. La Vanguardia evidently intended to motivate collective 
opposition to fascism in the face of defeat in order to keep alive the revolutionary spirit 
that had transformed Barcelona over the previous decade. In this respect, one could argue, 
La Vanguardia may have succeeded, as Spain stunned the world with its peaceful transition 
to democracy in 1975. 
 La Vanguardia diagnosed the Spanish Civil War as a battle for democracy, liberty 
and justice. It stated that an armed defense was the only means by which to protect those 
values. It sought to galvanize collective action by constantly reminding readers of the 
terrifying consequences of a Republican collapse. What makes La Vanguardia’s coverage 
in 1938 so fascinating is that it emboldened these collective action frames as Franco’s 
victory became inevitable, apparently in response to this development. Why it did so 
remains unclear, but it appears that the newspaper spoke to multiple audiences: 
Catalonians, foreign sympathizers, and most interestingly, future generations. The frames 
crafted by La Vanguardia reveal a telling aspect of the Republican political discourse, that 
of complete faith in a revolutionary future for a people still to come. La Vanguardia 
evidently recognized, in the same vein as Unamuno, that the liberal ideals that had taken 
root in Spain would eventually resurge to reclaim its legacy. Orwell and his contemporaries 
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may have lamented the bitter end of Spanish democracy in 1939 and the subsequent lies to 
be aired in the wake of a fascist takeover, yet international scholarship has ultimately 
favored the Spanish Left. Contrary, then, to Orwell’s assertion that “the winners write 
history,” the Spanish Civil War proves that some narratives are defined by the “losers.”292 
Indeed, the case of La Vanguardia suggests that the historical record is determined by more 
than just military victories. 
 It has already been demonstrated that wartime journalism is evaluated according to 
different criteria than other journalistic forms: it enjoys an elevated status and is allowed 
greater liberties in the open expression of opinion, emotion, and bias on behalf of the 
reporter. One is led to consider, then, that the frames constructed in wartime to motivate 
collective action might also be evaluated differently. To this effect, I propose that this type 
of framing analysis should also be applied to the coverage of an equally prominent Madrid-
based newspaper, such as ABC, in the same years (1936-1939) so that I might investigate 
this further. Such a study would prove useful in identifying the trends and patterns of 
Spain’s resistance to fascism, thereby contributing a more comprehensive understanding 
of the ideologies communicated by Spanish Republican media.
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